A Different Kind of Partner
A Paradigm for Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in Pakistan

Views of Network 20/20’s 2008 Delegation to Pakistan

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A Different Kind of Partner: A Paradigm for Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in Pakistan

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A Different Kind of Partner:  
A Paradigm for Democracy and Counter-terrorism in Pakistan

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A prime concern for the United States today is the diminishment of its influence in Pakistan. It is still possible to prevent the more dire consequences of this decline. Doing so will require a new U.S. policy—one that does not, as in the recent past, alienate Pakistanis by fixating on American security goals in the Pashtun tribal areas that border Afghanistan at the cost of a partnership with the country as a whole. With a different approach, the United States has a real chance to gain the cooperation of new political forces emerging in Pakistan.

The United States’ strategic interest in Pakistan is undeniable. Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal; its north-west border territory has also served as a base for Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters operating in Afghanistan and is key to the resurgence of attacks on American forces there. But simply meeting Islamist extremism in Pakistan with force has not succeeded. In addition to the threat posed by extremists, Pakistan faces pressing crises in its economic, social, and political development, particularly in terms of poverty, food shortages, energy, and education. If the United States were to help address these crises, we could build partnerships across Pakistani society that would counter Islamist extremism throughout the country.

A bill known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act is working its way through the U.S. Congress. If passed, the legislation would provide a significant increase in non-military aid to Pakistan. The bill has—and deserves—broad support. It would give the next American president an unprecedented opportunity to build a more positive and sustainable relationship with Pakistan. Additionally, the United States, United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom on September 26 launched a “Friends of Pakistan” group of donor countries to coordinate urgently needed economic aid. The quick enactment of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act would serve to kick start the Friends of Pakistan initiative and for that reason should be immediately addressed by Congress.1

We believe that the United States can and should promote democratic pluralism, economic and social development, and nuclear non-proliferation simultaneously even while it pursues its war on terrorism in Pakistan and throughout the world. The dilemma and challenge for the United States is to mesh our security interests and other priorities in Pakistan and Afghanistan in an effective strategy.

1 Other members of the Friends of Pakistan group are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Turkey, China, the European Union and the United Nations. The co-chairs of the group are Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari, the foreign ministers of the U.A.E. and Britain and the American Secretary of State. The group plans a meeting in late October at which specific aid commitments will be made.
The proposed Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act provides an opportunity for the United States to maintain its own security and promote democracy simultaneously, rather than pitting these two goals against each other. It will help align U.S. priorities with those of Pakistan and broaden our bilateral relations. For this legislation to work, a more detailed understanding of Pakistan’s politics, economy, and current conditions is vital. Significant strands of Pakistani society are open to establishing constructive relations with the United States, but they need to be effectively engaged and convinced that U.S. security priorities will not prevent broader assistance to Pakistan.

Network 20/20 is a New York-based educational organization that connects young private-sector leaders from the United States with their counterparts in other countries. Network 20/20 members have proved to be effective interlocutors with policymakers, providing fresh insights from professionals who are highly motivated and deeply engaged in issues of foreign policy but who have thriving careers outside of that sphere. A Network 20/20 delegation visited Pakistan in May 2008 with three goals in mind:

1. To acquire a better understanding of Pakistan and Pakistani views of the war on terrorism and the danger of nuclear proliferation;

2. To gain insight into the impact of the on-again, off-again quality of Pakistani-U.S. bilateral relations; and

3. To make concrete recommendations as to how the United States can seize this moment to strengthen our alliances across Pakistani society, rather than just with the military.

In a 10-day trip to Pakistan flanked by side trips to Afghanistan and India, Network 20/20 conducted more than 60 interviews. Our subjects, in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Multan, Rawalpindi, Kabul, and New Delhi, represented a cross-section of Pakistani society: government officials, members of parliament, military officers, academics, business executives, journalists, community organizers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and religious leaders, including radical Islamists. Many interviewees spoke English; Network 20/20’s Urdu-speaking members conversed with those who did not.

Overall, we found that Pakistanis see the war on terrorism—in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and internationally—as a U.S. agenda item that conflicts with Pakistan’s own interests. At the same time, Pakistanis strongly oppose fundamentalism and support democracy, as evidenced by the February 2008 elections, in which fundamentalist alliances were voted out of power in two provinces, the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan that had been their strongholds. While Pakistanis oppose Islamist extremists, condemn suicide bombing, and support democracy, they have more pressing priorities: addressing the severe economic stress brought about by rising food prices and longer and longer electricity cuts; the debate over how to fight insurgents; and the generalized demand for rule of law throughout the country.
To gain effective Pakistani support for the U.S. war on terrorism, the United States needs to reconcile our objectives with those of Pakistani society. We must forge alliances with multiple public and private constituencies and address the food and energy crises immediately to stem unrest and help stabilize the government.

Our main recommendations to U.S. opinion leaders and policymakers are that:

- The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act should be passed and signed into law quickly. It should also fund the creation of an advisory body of Pakistanis from government and civil society to plan its implementation, to evaluate the aid program and to prevent corruption. This body should meet regularly with representatives of the United States, and its findings should be disclosed publicly.

- Civilian aid should be uncoupled from sanctions. Such a step would neutralize a well-founded Pakistani fear that the United States is mostly interested in supporting military governments in Pakistan. This measure is contained in the proposed Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, and should be approved in the final version of the law.

- Energy security for Pakistan should be a U.S. priority, because energy shortages are a major cause of instability and an impediment to economic growth. To do this the United States will need to be flexible on issues such as the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and civilian nuclear cooperation, which could be negotiated in parallel with U.S. efforts to bring Pakistan into nuclear non-proliferation agreements.

- In addition to emergency food aid, the United States should provide emergency aid to the hundreds of thousands of people displaced by military actions against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. This should be approached with the same urgency as the successful U.S. relief effort after the earthquake in Pakistan’s northern areas in 2005.

- The next U.S. president should weigh the tactical gains from air strikes, military incursions, and detentions in Pakistan against the longer-term harm they do to our alliance with Islamabad and our reputation among the Pakistani people.

See full recommendations on page 26.
INTRODUCTION

Americans and Pakistanis look at their bilateral relations through disparate lenses. They focus on different events and accentuate different benefits and grievances. For Pakistanis, the decision by the United States to impose sanctions on their country after it tested a nuclear weapon in 1998 was a sign of America’s unreliability as an ally. This was seen as a repeat of early 1990s U.S. sanctions against Pakistan after U.S. interests in Afghanistan were served. The removal of the 1998 sanctions after September 11, 2001, when the United States named Pakistan as a “major non-NATO ally” in its war on terrorism, was seen by many Pakistanis as the product of a deal brokered with a military leader, General Pervez Musharraf, rather than an alliance between the two nations. U.S. military action against the Taliban in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas has caused deep unease within the Pakistani military and among the public; one common complaint is that Pakistan has given in to pressure to fight fellow Muslims on behalf of the United States. Pakistanis know that their military benefits from more than $1 billion in U.S. aid (part of which represented reimbursements for logistical support) every year, but they do not see benefits to their society. Additionally, almost all Pakistanis see U.S. objections to their country’s nuclear weapons program as discriminatory.

By contrast, American policymakers see Pakistan as the unreliable recipient of U.S. funds to fight terrorism; Pakistanis, in their view, have been weak-kneed in carrying out counter-terrorism objectives. They question why Pakistan has not been able to defeat the Taliban within its borders or to deliver up the United States’ nemesis, Osama bin Laden, who is alleged to have found sanctuary in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Increasingly, American officials have suggested to reporters that Pakistan is playing a “double game,” maintaining operational ties to the Taliban and other armed Islamist groups while intermittently cooperating with the United States against them.

American popularity briefly rose after the 2005 earthquake when the U.S. government provided humanitarian aid to Pakistan, but it sunk soon afterwards, to as low as 15 percent according to a 2007 Pew poll. Until only a few months before his forced resignation on August 18, 2008, Washington vocally supported General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in a bloodless military coup d’état in 1999, as the guarantor of our interests in Pakistan, despite his declining approval ratings among most Pakistanis. The previous year, U.S. officials and diplomats had remained silent about Musharraf’s dismissal and detention of the chief justice of Pakistan’s Supreme Court and some 60 other appeals court justices, putting us on the wrong side of an issue that galvanized Pakistani opposition to his government.

Our “one-stop shopping” relationship with Musharraf—relying on him as the representative of both the military and the ostensibly civilian government—proved to be damaging. It failed to further our nuclear non-proliferation and anti-terrorism goals, and it
alienated many Pakistani leaders, including moderate, secular democrats. Such a personalized relationship should not be replicated with Pakistan’s new president, Asif Ali Zardari. Instead, the aid program envisioned in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act should be an instrument for the United States to build broad ties with Pakistani society.2

As Pakistan emerges from a new round of elections, and attempts to shift the balance of state authority from the military to an elected civilian government, the United States needs a new paradigm for its relations with this geopolitically important ally—one that can simultaneously promote democracy, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation while taking immediate steps to help Pakistan achieve stability and prosperity. Economic support for Pakistan is a prerequisite for strengthening the state against Islamist extremism.

Important forces in Pakistan recognize the issues the country faces, and in recent years non-governmental organizations have begun to confront these challenges. They have also contributed to an expansion of the intellectual resources available to analyze Pakistan’s problems. Many of the forces that have emerged in civil society oppose Islamist violence and want to address corruption and military influence in their society and strengthen the rule of law. Broadly speaking, they supported the election, in February 2008, of a coalition civilian government. (That coalition has now begun to fracture.) The United States needs to ally itself with these civil society forces.

There is new urgency to these goals: Pakistan’s economic crisis threatens to unleash civil unrest and to undermine the newly elected government; relations with India are at a low ebb and a confrontation there could draw the Pakistani army away from the fight against the Taliban; and unilateral military action by the United States within Pakistan’s borders threatens to turn the public and the army against Pakistan’s civilian government, which is widely believed to have privately consented to U.S. air strikes and commando raids in the tribal areas. The resulting instability could derail Pakistan’s battle against Islamist extremists. Again, vital American interests are at stake here, and not only because of our fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. If Pakistan itself turned against the West, it could well become a menace that would dwarf all other regional threats.

Terrorist attacks in Pakistan have escalated recently, most dramatically with the September 20th bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad. Pakistan has stepped up military operations against armed Islamists in Bajaur Agency, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and in the Swat district of NWFP; at the same time, the United States has staged air strikes (using drones) and at least one incursion in

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Waziristan, which has heightened tensions between Washington and Islamabad, with reports that Pakistani troops have fired on U.S. helicopters to keep them from entering their nation’s airspace. The stepped-up U.S. military activity has aroused vehement opposition among much of the Pakistani public. It is not yet clear whether the United States and Pakistan will be able to resolve these bilateral tensions and succeed militarily against al-Qaeda and allied groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, but, if they do, and if military gains are to be sustained on the ground, economic and reconstruction aid will be all the more necessary.

In order to formulate an effective, sustainable foreign policy toward Pakistan, Americans need information on what Pakistanis think, believe, and feel about their own society, and about what they see as their place in the international system. This report is an attempt to outline, drawing on recent on-the-ground interviews and discussions, how Pakistanis view U.S.-Pakistan relations and what their aims and goals are, both as individuals and for their country.
MAIN FINDINGS

We heard vehement criticism of U.S. foreign policy during our visit to Pakistan, much of it from educated Pakistanis whose support the United States needs. One particular source of anger was what our interlocutors saw as America’s history of supporting military governments in Pakistan and neglecting civilian ones. We learned that Pakistanis are preoccupied with bread-and-butter issues rather than with the U.S. war on terrorism; at the same time, they generally accepted the premise that our two countries have important common interests, including in the fight against terrorism.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, now before Congress, opens the way for a broad spectrum of support that goes well beyond military aid. This act should be passed and signed into law: It would give the next American administration an unprecedented opportunity to build a more secure and sustainable relationship with Pakistan than we have had to date. It promises $1.5 billion annually to Pakistan for the next 5 to 10 years for development in governance and in the free market economy, and promises to raise standards of living.

This is a critical matter. The United States is locked in a strategically important battle to defeat the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Pakistan even as a dire economic crisis threatens the stability of that country. There is no time to waste in implementing immediate non-military economic assistance while also pursuing our long-term goals.

In order to capitalize on our common interests we need to understand how Pakistanis frame our differences and how we, in turn, can reframe our priorities in order to find support for them in Pakistan.

Opposition to U.S. Policy in Pakistan

Opposition to U.S. policy in Pakistan is focused on three issues: a) our support for the Pakistani military as it intervenes in Pakistani politics, especially our backing of General Pervez Musharraf, the recently removed military leader; b) our unrealistic expectation that Pakistan’s army can control Islamist militants in its border regions without corresponding political reforms and economic progress in those areas and throughout the country; and c) our condemnation of Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and missile development programs, which are seen by most Pakistanis as emblems of their sovereignty. Pakistan is facing great economic stress, including rising food prices, energy shortages, trade deficits, and the high cost of its military. There are equally important and neglected social issues, including deficiencies in education and public health and in the status of women.

In Pakistan, we heard conflicting assessments of relations with India. By many accounts, there is a possibility of greater cooperation and peace between the two countries, which have fought three wars since 1947, but this opening needs reinforcement. At the same
time, several interviewees suggested that, once the war on terrorism winds down, Washington’s dominant interest in strengthening ties with India will work to Pakistan’s long-term disadvantage.

**Terrorism Is a Shared Threat for Pakistan and the United States**

There is widespread revulsion at Islamist violence in Pakistan. And yet the narrow way the United States has framed its counter-terrorism strategy has prevented it from establishing a common agenda with Pakistanis. Specifically, the United States has concentrated on fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda in western Pakistan’s border regions; but Islamist organizations (some of which are allied with the Taliban and al-Qaeda) also operate in other parts of Pakistan, notably in the Punjab.

The Unites States’ almost exclusive focus on infiltration from Pakistan into Afghanistan has served to obscure the threat Pakistani jihadi organizations pose, both domestically and to the West. “The real threat lies in the existence of groups, networks, and organizations that violate Pakistani law every day, that use criminal violence against citizens in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India,” said Samina Ahmed, the International Crisis Group’s representative in Pakistan. “The state must take action against those who violate the law regardless of their motives.”

In an interview with Network 20/20, Intizar Hussain, Pakistan’s leading Urdu fiction writer, commented that his four novels were all written in response to national crises, particularly partition and the separation of Bangladesh. Now, he said, at age 83, he was watching as Pakistan faced its “greatest crisis.” Asked what that crisis was, the writer replied, “Jihad.”

Hussain Haqqani, the Pakistani ambassador to the United States and a key political advisor to President Zardari, told us, “The people have basically voted against Talibanization, and that settles the question of the will of the people.” Opinion polls conducted before and after the February elections by Terror Free Tomorrow, a U.S. non-profit, corroborate this claim, and we found concern about terrorism to be widespread. “Terrorism is the biggest problem,” a young man named Imtiaz told us when we approached him in the Salt Bazaar in Peshawar. “They want to destroy peace for their own interests and everyone is afraid that death is knocking.”

Among liberal intellectuals there is a significant faction that, like the United States, sees Islamist violence as an existential threat. Jugnu Mohsin, editor of the *Friday Times*, an English-language weekly, asserted, “In an age when you can carry a nuclear bomb in a suitcase, we are all in this together.”

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It is difficult for the Pakistani government to address the terrorist threat effectively, we were told, because the lines between civilian and military authority are not clear. “We have supported insurgencies in two key areas—Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan—with no civilian input,” said Ahmed Rashid, a journalist and author who has covered the rise of Islamist armed groups for decades. Rashid stressed the need for a public Pakistani debate on security issues: “The important question is, ‘To what extent is the army willing to share information and decision making with the civilian government?’”

The disconnect between the army and civilian politicians over security policy also weakens public support for the government, according to Najam Sethi, editor of the *Daily Times* and a supporter of security ties with the United States. “Many are now seeing our problems as internal, but not all in the army follow this,” he told us. “The Pakistani people are caught in the middle.”

**Pakistan’s Jihadists Are Nationwide**

America’s foremost concern regarding terrorism in Pakistan has, again, been the presence of al-Qaeda fighters in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas—seven districts, bordering Afghanistan, that are ruled by a federally appointed political agent in consultation with “tribal elders” appointed by the government. A secondary concern has been the reported presence of the Afghan Taliban leadership in Baluchistan, as well as alleged recruitment of fighters from refugee camps there. In recent months, the role of the Pashtun “Pakistani Taliban,” comprised, like the Afghan Taliban, of Pushtu-speaking fighters, has been the subject of increased American interest. But non-Pashtun Pakistani Islamist militant groups have figured less prominently in briefings on terrorism given by American officials and in the American media.4

Several Islamist movements from the plains of Pakistan, particularly from the populous state of Punjab, have flourished over the last 20 years. One such group, the Jaish-e-Muhammad, was linked to the abduction and murder of the American journalist Daniel Pearl. Most dramatically, the “Red Mosque” in central Islamabad, only a short distance from the Inter-Services Intelligence headquarters, became a refuge of heavily armed Islamist fighters in 2007.

A violent government crackdown on the Red Mosque in July 2007 unleashed a backlash that included suicide bombings aimed at the army and the Inter-Services Intelligence agency. By the end of the year, there had been nearly 60 suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan, including the December 27 explosion that killed Benazir Bhutto, a former prime minister, as she campaigned for her party, the Pakistan People’s Party, in Pakistan’s

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4 On July 31, Reuters reported from Washington: “Some of the more effective fighters in Afghanistan’s Kunar province have proved to be members of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, Punjab-based groups with a long record of violence in Indian Kashmir, a senior defense official said.” See [http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKN30509436_CH_242020080731](http://uk.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUKN30509436_CH_242020080731).
parliamentary elections. Bhutto was the most prominent Pakistani politician to argue that Islamist violence posed a threat to Pakistan’s existence. While these attacks abated after the February elections, they have since resumed.

A significant question in our interviews was whether the problem of Islamist extremist groups could be resolved through talks, or whether a military solution was necessary. Ambassador Haqqani argued forcefully that the elected government could succeed in disarming militants by a process of dialogue along the lines of the Good Friday agreement in Northern Ireland. He said talks had been initiated first in Swat, a “settled area” outside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas that was overrun by Islamist fighters in 2007, because there was “less fire power” there. He argued that the tribal areas would be addressed “stage by stage.”

We encountered support for a political approach in territory where Islamist militant groups hold sway, including from the newly elected representative of North Waziristan in parliament, the 26-year-old Kamran Khan. “The last government wanted to change things by the gun, but that is never possible,” said Khan, who before the election was reportedly allied with the Taliban. “Without peace, how can you build roads, schools, and factories—how can you have the basic requirements of being human?”

Hasham Baber, a spokesman for the Awami National Party, the secular political party that won control over the provincial government of the North-West Frontier Province in the recent elections, was also optimistic about the capacity of elected civilian leaders to reach effective agreements. Still, his party has complained that the army has made its own deals with militants aimed at temporary cease-fires.

The army’s chief spokesman, Major General Athar Abbas, director general of Inter-Services Public Relations, told us that, in the tribal areas, the army’s role now is to restore order. While “there are times when the army over engages in law and order operations,” he said, “henceforth it should be the political prong.” But many experts dispute these official characterizations.

When the use of force against Islamist violence is framed in terms of the U.S. war in Afghanistan, the fight against armed Islamists is deeply unpopular in Pakistan. Few Pakistanis see their country as the source of Islamist violence; almost universally, they see its origins in the history of U.S. support for anti-Soviet Islamists in the 1980s. “The roots are in Afghanistan and the solution is also in Afghanistan,” Owais Ahmed Ghani, North-West Frontier Province’s governor, whom Musharraf appointed in January, told us. His remark was a neat reversal of conventional wisdom in the United States about how our setbacks in Afghanistan have their source in Pakistan.

Many in Pakistan’s security forces are not convinced that fighting their fellow co-religionists and countrymen is the right thing to do and this attitude feeds displeasure
with U.S. insistence that the Pakistan’s army’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency should sever ties to the Taliban. The U.S. government should press hard also for a verifiable divorce between the I.S.I. and Pakistani jihadi groups, in addition to its insistence on a cutoff of ties with groups operating in Afghanistan. Demonstrating that the United States equally opposes Islamist groups that operate in Pakistan could win sympathy for our demands that Pakistan eliminate safe havens for those that operate in Afghanistan.

While the Federally Administered Tribal Areas provide terrorists a base of operations, any lasting solution must undermine the impetus to jihad throughout Pakistan. A U.S. policy that addresses Pakistan’s need for effective counter-insurgency—that aligns our interests in fighting terrorism with Pakistani aversion to jihadi violence—could win us allies among the public. Additionally, the United States should immediately begin to deliver emergency relief to the growing number of Pakistanis who have become refugees within Pakistan as a result of anti-terrorist military operations. Estimates of the number of internally displaced people now reach into hundreds of thousands.

A.Q. Khan for President?

Nuclear nationalism trumps nuclear safeguards for most Pakistanis. The deteriorating position of U.S. forces in Afghanistan has in recent months dominated American discussion of Pakistan, but the country’s nuclear arsenal is a long-standing concern. The journalist Seymour Hersh has reported that nuclear weapons were assembled and mounted on F-16s for use during confrontations with India in 1989 and 2002. Bruce Reidel, a Clinton administration South Asia specialist on the National Security Council, asserts that weapons were also made ready during the Pakistani incursion at Kargil in Indian-administered Kashmir in 1999.  

Hersh makes the argument that a military mobilization during which Pakistan’s nuclear components are removed from secure storage, assembled, and deployed on airfields around the country is the moment of greatest risk of a weapon’s being stolen, sold, or voluntarily offered to Islamist terrorists. Yet this frightening scenario has little resonance among Pakistanis, or even Indians. Except for a few anti-nuclear activists, most Pakistanis believe nuclear weapons have enhanced their security. This is largely true in India as well. “Because of the nuclear deterrent, conventional war between the two countries is no longer an option,” said the Indian foreign secretary, Shiv Shankar Menon, in an interview in New Delhi.

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In Pakistan, both of the two secular national political parties are proud of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. Pakistan People’s Party founder Zulfikar Ali Bhutto promised after India tested a “peaceful nuclear device” in 1974 that the country would “eat grass” if it had to for the sake of building a similar weapon. In 1998, his daughter, Benazir Bhutto, offered her bangles to Nawaz Sharif, who, as prime minister, was weighing inducements from the Clinton administration to forgo testing a bomb in response to India’s own successful tests. Bhutto’s gesture impugned Sharif’s masculinity and egged him on to the tests, which he went ahead with despite great pressure from the United States.

“We have earned nuclear capability the hard way and we’re not going to give it up,” said Hamid Gul, who was the Inter-Services Intelligence chief at the end of the Soviet-era war in Afghanistan. “It is not America’s problem.” Gul’s rhetoric may be intemperate, but he was addressing an issue that is more contentious under democratic rule than dictatorship: the equation of Pakistan’s nuclear program with its sovereignty. “On the issue of nuclear weapons there has not been any political party which supports denuclearization and the army certainly does not,” we were told by Pervez Hoodbhoy, a physicist at Quaid-e-Azam University and Pakistan’s most outspoken nuclear critic.

One sign of Pakistan’s defiance on the nuclear issue has been the heightened visibility, since the arrival of elected government, of the disgraced nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, whom Musharraf put under house arrest in 2004, after international outrage at the discovery of Khan’s sales of uranium enrichment technology to Iran and Libya. In July, the new civilian government allowed Khan to challenge his detention in court. And in a June poll by the International Republican Institute, 67 percent of Pakistani respondents said they would support Khan’s election as president.6

The U.S. Nuclear Message Is Discriminatory to Pakistani Ears

Major General Abbas, the army spokesman, assured us, as he does any visitor who asks, that Pakistan has eliminated the loose links in the nuclear supply chain that Khan’s network exploited. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, who served under Musharraf as Foreign Minister of Pakistan from 2002 to 2007 and was vice chairman of the National Command Authority that supervises Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, said, “We have multi-layered protection rings around all our nuclear establishments.”

Hoodbhoy, the anti-nuclear scientist, is skeptical of the government’s assurances. “They have got pretty good at their PowerPoint presentations,” he said sarcastically. “But there are ‘baby Kahutas’ about which we have no knowledge.” he added. (Kahuta, the site of

6 For the I.R.I. poll, see: http://www.iri.org/mena/pakistan/pdfs/2008%20July%2017%20Survey%20of%20Pakistan%20Public%20Opinion%20June%201-15%202008.pdf. p. 40. It may be noted that the civilian government proposes to make the powers of the president mainly ceremonial, which is similar to the office in India, where Abdus Kalam, the “father” of India’s nuclear program, served as president from 2002 to 2007.
A.Q. Khan’s uranium enrichment facility, is used here by Hoodbhoy as shorthand for military facilities that produce smaller amounts of nuclear material.)

For the moment, Pakistan’s nuclear program is not a burning issue domestically. Unlike in previous years, the tenth anniversary of the May 1998 nuclear tests was not widely celebrated. There are even some signs of cynicism about the social utility of nuclear weapons capability. “The country is ‘atomic’ and the people are hungry,” said Muhammad Arshad, a 22-year-old M.A. student we met at a roadside soft drink shop in southern Punjab.

Nevertheless, the United States has little persuasive power on this issue in Pakistan. Besides possessing its own nuclear arsenal, the United States is viewed as acquiescent to Israel’s unacknowledged nuclear capability and as playing favorites in the Bush administration’s offer of cooperation with India on civilian nuclear reactors. Pakistanis also tend to interpret mounting U.S. pressure on Iran’s uranium enrichment program as yet another example of nuclear discrimination.

We will likely have few allies in Pakistan on this question. But broad progress toward multilateral nuclear disarmament could make a difference. “Suppose the U.S. was to take the initiative,” Hoodbhoy suggested. “That would set a climate for the whole world to follow suit. It’s quite possible that Pakistan would see that nuclear weapons aren’t giving it any advantage at all.” Others caution that a revision of popular Pakistani attitudes about the country’s nuclear arsenal is not possible without massive economic development, followed by resolution of long-standing tensions with India. In any case, the United States needs to reframe its description of proliferation risks in Pakistan if it is to gain a hearing there.

A Development Agenda Provides a Foundation for Bilateral Security

Among the promising aspects of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2008, in terms of the message it sends to Pakistan, is that it makes military aid, but not non-military aid, conditional on certification by the Department of State that Pakistani security forces are "making concerted efforts" against al-Qaeda, that they are "making concerted efforts" to prevent the Afghan Taliban from using Pakistani territory, and that they are not "materially interfering in political or judicial processes." The uncoupling of civilian aid from sanctions would neutralize a recurrent and well-founded Pakistani fear that the United States is mostly interested in supporting military governments in Pakistan.

Another element of the legislation that will be welcome in Pakistan is the extension of aid throughout Pakistan, not just in the border areas next to Afghanistan. There will be challenges on the American end in implementing this policy shift, however. Headlines in U.S. newspapers and sound bites on our campaign trails continue to emphasize pressuring Pakistan to block al-Qaeda and Taliban militants from using Pakistani territory as a safe
haven from which to launch attacks in Afghanistan. If official U.S. suspicions of ties between Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency and al-Qaeda harden into an established perception of fact, the idea that aid can yield a “democracy dividend” will be exposed to even greater skepticism.

No U.S. president is likely to abandon the military option in the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but if Pakistan is to be fully enlisted in the fight against them we must support a broader-based counter-insurgency program in Pakistan that would deliver on the expectations of Pakistanis for economic, human, and political development.

During our field research for this report, we were struck by the number of Pakistanis who insisted that improvements, even in specific areas, depend on establishment of a democratic process, and we heard a lively and freewheeling debate on how to accomplish this. Democratization inevitably requires a retreat from political influence on the part of Pakistan’s military, which over long years has come to enjoy a privileged position not only in Pakistan’s politics but also throughout its economy.

The Pakistani public may benefit more from trade with the United States than it does from U.S. aid to its government. In 2007, $3.5 billion of exports went from Pakistan to the United States, versus $1.9 billion in U.S. exports to Pakistan. By far, Pakistan’s largest source of export receipts in bilateral trade with the United States is textiles—$1.3 billion in 2007. The proposed new policy, with the promise of greatly increasing bilateral non-military aid and stimulating trade, marks a sea change in the Pakistan-American relationship.7

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7 For figures on U.S. aid see Rick Barton and Craig Cohen, “A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan,” Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 2007, http://www.csis.org/images/stories/pcr/070727_pakistan.pdf. Barton and Cohen state: “Of the $10.58 billion in assistance dispensed to Pakistan since 9/11, 60 percent has gone toward Coalition Support Funds (CSF). CSF is money intended to reimburse U.S. coalition partners for their assistance in the war on terrorism, and it is not considered by the U.S. government as assistance. Roughly 15 percent of the funds provided to Pakistan, or close to $1.6 billion, has been dedicated to security assistance. The Pakistanis have spent most of this money on purchases of major weapons systems. Another 15 percent has been allocated toward budget support, which is offered as direct cash transfers to the government of Pakistan. This money is intended to provide macroeconomic stability and to free up funds for social spending, but few transparent accountability mechanisms are built in. This allocation leaves roughly 10 percent of U.S. government assistance provided specifically for development and humanitarian assistance in Pakistan, including the U.S. response to the October 2005 earthquake.”


Pakistan’s Economic Crisis Is a National Security Issue for the United States

Political security in Pakistan cannot be achieved without addressing economic insecurity, and energy shortages are a major cause of economic insecurity. As we traveled in Pakistan, we encountered growing agitation about bread-and-butter issues. This was corroborated by a poll conducted in June by Terror Free Tomorrow in which 86 percent of Pakistanis said they struggled to buy flour and 81 percent said they had been hurt by the high price of fuel. “The real security issue is the state of the economy and the tremendously high expectations of the people,” said Nafisa Shah, an Oxford-trained anthropologist who now represents a rural Sindh district in the National Assembly. “There is tremendous public pressure.”

Rescheduling of debt, inflow of investment from the Persian Gulf into the property market and cell phone companies, expansion of consumer credit, and repatriation of Pakistani wealth held abroad are all cited as factors behind the boom that followed September 11, 2001, when Pakistan’s economy grew as much as 7 percent per year. Inflation in food prices, stalled growth in the agricultural economy, and unemployment all persisted during the boom, however, and now, with the boom over, economic stress even more pronounced. Pakistan’s energy crisis is hurting the important agriculture and textile sectors, with irrigation pumps and looms idled by power cuts, and its foreign currency reserves are running out. Additionally, declining foreign currency reserves, caused largely by rising costs of imported oil, threaten the country’s fiscal viability.

The U.S. government needs a stable Pakistan, but it has so far exacerbated Pakistan’s economic problems by not addressing the country’s energy shortages. The United States should reconsider its opposition to the pipeline now on the drawing board to connect natural gas fields in Iran with markets in Pakistan and India and its refusal to offer Pakistan a plan for cooperation on civilian nuclear power plants similar to one agreed to with India. Both U.S. positions are based on non-proliferation concerns, with the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline running afoul of U.S. demands for international sanctions against Iran’s uranium enrichment program. They have had the effect of slowing economic growth that the new civilian government needs in order to maintain its political viability. An agreement of civilian nuclear cooperation need not be hastily made. Negotiations on the issue should address U.S. requirements for nonproliferation. But the negotiations should begin soon.

The rising price of staple food items, particularly flour, is another urgent problem undermining support for the Pakistani state. While the United States has offered emergency food supplies, a longer-term program to provide food security to average Pakistanis is necessary. The United States should take care that airlifts of American wheat do not economically undercut Pakistan’s own food production. Longer-term cooperation on water supply and irrigation as well as on the development of agricultural extension services and micro-credit for the poorest Pakistanis in rural areas is also vital.
Economic Progress Requires Social Development, Especially for Women

In the Zia-ul Haq era, boosters of military rule in Pakistan used to spin figures by comparing the pace of development in the 1960s, when East Pakistan was still part of Pakistan, to the more rapid pace in the 1980s, after that territory gained independence as Bangladesh. Because Pakistan had lost its much poorer eastern wing, the figures made it appear that the average Pakistani’s lot had greatly improved.

Such a trick would no longer produce flattering trend lines. According to the United Nations Development Program’s human development index, Pakistan ranks 136 out of 177 nations, while Bangladesh is 140th. In terms of infant mortality, Pakistan is considerably worse off than Bangladesh, according to UNICEF figures. “Maternal mortality is very high, there has been stagnation in the declines achieved for infant mortality, and we are stuck at 30 percent access to contraceptives,” said Zeba Sathar, country director for the Population Council, a highly regarded international NGO that focuses on reproductive health.8

Without a consistent and concerted effort to address poverty, Pakistan is in danger of falling behind comparable countries in Asia and the Muslim world. “When we say poor here we mean the absolute poor,” says Tasneem Siddiqui, director of the Orangi Pilot Project, one of the country’s most successful development projects. “We have poor people living above the official poverty line—74 percent of all Pakistanis live on two dollars a day.”

This impoverished majority has benefited least from macro-economic growth in the past decade, and faces great stress from the current economic downturn. “There is now focus on increasing human security, but the global situation is such that it lends force to military security lobbies,” said A. H. Nayyar, a social scientist at the Sustainable Development Policy Institute in Islamabad. “Everybody sees the growing poverty, but there is no understanding of how one can manage it collectively.”

Education Is the Key Public Good

Nowhere are the needs for progress in delivery of public services more urgent than in the field of education. According to UNESCO, the national adult literacy rate for Pakistan is just under 54 percent, fully 10 percent lower than the average in south and west Asia. The literacy rate is even worse for women, at just under 40 percent, and in the tribal areas along the Afghan border as few as three women in a hundred can read. Funding for

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education at all levels comprises just 2.4 percent of the national economy, and when foreign aid is stripped out the figure is just 1 percent, according to UNICEF.9

Ironically, education has received enormous attention from foreign and private-sector donorns in Pakistan. The United States has made primary education a centerpiece of its promised social-sector aid package. Our visit to Lahore coincided with a high-society fund-raiser for the Citizens Foundation, a private charity that since 1995 has opened 311 schools in urban slums and rural areas, educating 38,000 students and employing 2,400 teachers. The American mountain climber Greg Mortenson’s success in establishing some 45 schools in Pakistan’s mountain areas has been celebrated in the United States as an example of how consultation with local communities can lead to rapid improvements.10

Ordinary Pakistanis also place a high value on education. Abbas Rashid, convener of a network of educators called the Campaign for Quality Education, argued that the “huge social demand for education is seen in the phenomenon of the private schools,” which proliferate in rural areas and in cities. “People go to some amazing lengths to educate their children,” he said. But he also noted that there is a 30 to 40 percent dropout rate “when parents sense there is no delivery taking place.”

Nayyar, who has written extensively on education, cautioned that formal education primarily benefits students who receive university degrees and are able to enter professions. Most Pakistani young people, however, receive less than a high-school education. Nevertheless, Pakistani youth want to study: A national survey of adolescents conducted shortly after September 11, 2001, by Sathar and others at the Population Council found that 85 percent of boys wanted to study through high school or university, while 69 percent of girls aspired to at least a high-school diploma.11

The demand for education among Pakistanis extends throughout Pakistani society and all of its provinces. Meeting that demand would give Pakistanis a real stake in their society,


and this in turn would undermine the utopian alternatives provided by political Islam. In supporting educational development, the United States should listen closely to Pakistani educators. Particularly, the justified emphasis on primary education should not preclude support for higher education. Pakistani universities train the teachers who teach in the country’s primary schools and they need to be supported, too.

**Rule of Law Is a Top Priority for Pakistanis Today**

With its resonant cry for “justice” and its angry one of “Go, Musharraf. Go,” the lawyers movement that emerged in response to Musharraf’s abrupt dismissal of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March 2007, and of some 60 other appeals judges in November, galvanized the country. It set a precedent in Pakistan by mobilizing public opinion across a startling range of partisan affiliations, and set the stage for the electoral rejection of Musharraf. The protests by members of the Pakistani bar also evoked broad sympathy among the American people. The bonds that developed in response between American bar associations and their Pakistani counterparts are a new chapter in people-to-people relations between our two countries.

The restoration of the judges to their posts, which would ratify the principle of judicial review of actions by both the military and politicians, continues to be an important issue. The chief justice has popular appeal not only as a constitutional figure but as the personification of aspirations for the rule of law rather than of the gun. Mukhtar Mai, the now internationally known rape victim turned rights activist who has built a school and a women’s shelter in her south Punjab village, described Chaudhry’s return to the bench as “his right—he should be restored.” Her aide Naseem interjected, “Without justice there can be no development.”

The post-election coalition of the Pakistan People’s Party, led by Asif Ali Zardari, and the Pakistan Muslim League, led by Nawaz Sharif, foundered in September over the issue of the chief justice’s restoration. Sharif wanted Chaudhry back on the bench; Zardari demurred, reportedly because of concerns that Chaudhry might declare Musharraf’s National Reconciliation Ordinance null and void, leading to reopening of corruption cases against Zardari; and Sharif withdrew his support from Zardari. Many Pakistanis expressed disappointment over how the coalition handled the issue. “In any transition, the last thing you want to see is a crisis at the beginning,” said Samina Ahmed, representative of the International Crisis Group in Islamabad. “I don’t think the politicians understand the gravity of the situation.”

The United States viewed the judges issue as an internal matter for Pakistan, and indeed the question became a domestic political football. But keeping its distance cost the United

12 For evidence of continued strong support for restoration of the pre-November 2007 judiciary, see the June International Republican Institute poll: http://www.iri.org/asia/pakistan/2008-07-16-Pakistan.asp.
States allies, especially as U.S. officials expressed strong support for Musharraf long after his political fate was sealed. Many Pakistanis we spoke to speculated that American silence on the judges question stemmed from Chaudhry’s willingness to hear the cases of “missing persons”—Pakistanis who have been detained without due process, some of whom are suspects in the U.S. war on terrorism. However, recently many of the deposed judges (around 65 percent) have taken new oaths to rejoin the high courts and Supreme Court after the new government promised them their previous seniority. This government move was criticized by the lawyers movement, because it did not include Chaudhry’s restoration.

The United States should not place its security demands above the strengthening of constitutional norms. Specifically, U.S. officials should monitor whether President Asif Ali Zardari follows through on his promise of a constitutional package that would subordinate the presidency to parliament and to the prime minister, and would revoke the extraordinary powers that previous military governments had assigned to the president.

**Potential Partners for Development**

While Pakistan’s grassroots NGO networks are, as yet, neither as extensive nor as developed as those in some South Asian countries, notably Bangladesh, it would be a mistake to underrate their potential. The more effective NGOs are incubators for an emerging expert constituency that, in consultation with journalists and other analysts, can help devise yardsticks for progress in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s people do have an impulse to help each other, as was proven by the massive voluntary response to the 2005 earthquake. (The Population Council’s Sathar commented that she was impressed by the “superb” managers she encountered in planning meetings between NGOs and the new government.) To develop capacity for participation in local development, donors should support exchanges with the more robust NGO networks in the region.

According to both Sathar and the Sustainable Development Policy Institute’s Nayyar, the civilian government has consulted with outside experts on Pakistan in launching its development agenda and its budget. The United States should do the same, in a regular way and with reports to the Pakistani public, as it initiates and implements the proposed new aid program. The United States should formally enlist Pakistani NGOs as partners and advisors for U.S. aid and it should invite their advice and criticism also on the wider aid program envisioned by the Friends of Pakistan donor countries. Another important factor to consider when outside donors seek to work with Pakistani

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13 An August seminar at Hoodbhoy’s Sustainable Development Policy Institute also called for a public consultative process in reviewing aid to Pakistan, see http://www.sdpi.org/SDPI_in_the_press/media%20coverage%202008/media_coverage_august_2008.html#14.
NGOs is the engagement of many of those groups with Pakistan’s politics. The offices of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in Lahore, and of the Aurat Foundation, in Karachi, were both venues for organizing public actions in response to Musharraf’s suspension of the constitution last year.

Finally, the United States needs to integrate its assistance with the broader movement toward making Pakistan a more pluralistic society. At a meeting to present the Campaign for Quality Education’s report to donors in Washington, D.C., Irfan Muzzaffar responded to a request for a single piece of advice on education in Pakistan by saying, “It is very important to support broader reform forces throughout society, instead of providing and then taking away crutches”—in other words, the United States should not impose rigid, inappropriate templates on Pakistani development and it should support political reform alongside economic and social development. His advice can be taken in virtually any area of concern for the United States in Pakistan, including security.

**U.S. Needs to Get, and Get On, Pakistani Television**

The Musharraf government licensed numerous satellite broadcasters to distribute news and entertainment programming throughout the country. Programming is for the most part in Urdu and other Pakistani languages and, on more than 50 channels, ranges from news to music to Islamic commentary to self-help—for example, the women’s rights activist Mukhtar Mai has a weekly call-in show on a Siraiki-language channel in southern Punjab.

In 2007, Musharraf’s government was shaken by television coverage of the protests against the dismissal of Chief Justice Chaudhry, in March, and against the declaration of a state of emergency, in November. Television channels were pressured to discontinue live news coverage and to take some of the most widely watched talk shows off the air. On at least two occasions, the Musharraf government forced satellite uplink facilities to discontinue transmission to Pakistan.

But the media crackdown backfired. By February 2008, an International Republican Institute poll found the local media had an 88 percent approval rating in Pakistan, higher than any other institution, and 64 percent said television was the main source of information on the coming elections. In an interview in April with the GEO network talk show host Dr. Shahid Masood, PPP leader Zardari commented a little ruefully on the cable news channels’ ability to guide public opinion. “We don’t have the power to shut it down,” he said.14

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Talat Hussein, executive director of news and current affairs at Aaj TV, acknowledged
criticism of the television news media, saying “some in the public think we have gone
overboard” on the judges issue. Muddassir Rizvi, a journalist himself who now heads the
election monitoring consortium FAFEN (Free and Fair Elections Network), complained
that the media have been slow to cover more nuanced issues like the composition of the
electorate or the social backgrounds of the candidates. Recently, “liberal hawks” in the
Pakistani media have charged the television talk shows with inflaming passions against
the United States, while other critics complain that they flip-flopped during the

Like American journalists, Pakistani reporters tend to cover the political horse race more
than the underlying issues. “If it is not flashy, the media doesn’t cover it,” Rizvi said. But
Sathar and others, including Fawzia Naqwi, of the Soros Fund, were hopeful of
influencing media to monitor the government on social issues. The United States could
help the electronic media address social concerns by, for example, participating in
television discussion of its aid program. U.S. officials also need to appear on Pakistani
talk shows to present America’s case for military action against al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

Pakistan’s Regional Concerns Should Concern America Too

Pakistanis are universally enraged by U.S. missile strikes and other military operations in
Pashtun areas of Pakistan. These tactical measures only alienate the same Pashtun voters
who recently threw parties allied to the Taliban out of office. While the civilian
government’s policy of negotiating with Islamist militants has so far yielded little
progress, the United States should not unequivocally reject this approach. Both Britain
and China have supported the concept of negotiations in areas where armed Islamists
hold sway.

Regional relationships are becoming increasingly important to Pakistan, particularly its
ties with China and India. In some cases and on some issues, Pakistan’s neighbors could
help the United States achieve important policy objectives.

“Pakistan is the only country we term as an ‘all-weather friendship,’” we were told by
Jiang Yili, who is counselor at the Chinese embassy in Islamabad. The co-translator of a
Jiang is also the wife of the Chinese ambassador.

Curiously, the Chinese diplomat did not express strong concern about terrorism in
Pakistan, even though Islamist militants killed several Chinese technicians in Baluchistan
and in the North-West Frontier Province in 2006 and 2007. She did acknowledge that
Uighur Muslim rebels from western China have taken refuge in Pakistan and that Chinese
workers on hydro-electric projects in Swat had been withdrawn because of security
concerns.
U.S. policymakers could leverage Pakistan’s close relationship with China to advance our national security goals. According to Yili, Chinese and American diplomats rarely consult each other in Islamabad outside of their meetings at national day parties and other functions. The United States could learn from China how China gets results from Pakistan.

India Is Increasingly a Partner

Network 20/20’s trip coincided with a meeting in Islamabad between the foreign ministers of India and Pakistan, which was followed by trade talks that have expanded the list of permitted trade goods between the two countries. Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureishi and his predecessor in Musharraf’s government, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, expressed new hope for the Indo-Pakistani relationship during their meetings with us.

The dispute over Kashmir, which began at independence in 1947, is on the table in both formal talks and back-channel negotiations. “If we can solve it, Kashmir will help heal the wounds,” said Kasuri. He added that Pakistani public opinion has been primed for a resolution of the Kashmir dispute. A recent poll found that neither country contains “strong majority opposition to Kashmir becoming an independent country or dividing Kashmir between Pakistan and India.” Kasuri was confident, too, that the public would not oppose an agreement on Kashmir. “It will not come as a surprise and it could be done very soon,” he claimed.

The Pakistani business leaders we interviewed seemed particularly eager for a rapprochement between Pakistan and India. “Anti-India is no longer an election issue in Pakistan,” said Amit Hashwani, a Karachi businessman and a principal backer of the Citizens Foundation, who has been active in people-to-people exchanges between Pakistani and Indian CEOs.

We did hear animosity toward India from conservatives such as Hamid Gul, the retired Inter-Services Intelligence chief. Amir Siddique, the deputy imam of the Red Mosque (which now is painted beige), complained that Pakistan’s politicians “talk nicely with India” and don’t solve economic problems. Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) and the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami are often reported to be hostile to India, but India did not feature prominently in our discussions with leaders of those parties. Curiously, India and Kashmir have appeared only rarely in the lists of “jihad lands” mentioned by al-Qaeda. “Somehow Kashmir has never appealed to the Arab mind,” remarked the Lahore journalist Khaled Ahmed. But in an August tape broadcast on

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Pakistan’s ARY One World television channel, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s second-in-command, placed special emphasis on India and Kashmir, accusing Musharraf of betraying Muslims there. With renewed firing by armies in Kashmir; with non-violent unrest and government repression in the Indian-administered Valley of Kashmir; and with Indian allegations of a Pakistani role in the July suicide bombing outside its embassy in Kabul, the danger of a military standoff between India and Pakistan is much greater than it has been in recent years. Such a standoff, even if it did not lead to war, would severely diminish cooperation between the United States and Pakistan against al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

The United States should give priority to neutralizing the Indo-Pakistani rivalry in Afghanistan, first of all by placing a high priority on countering anti-Indian Islamist organizations. We were told of a growing belief among some Pakistanis in and out of the military that there is a fundamental contradiction between Pakistan’s and America’s interests in the region. In this view, the two countries may collaborate in the near run but will ultimately be on opposing sides due to Washington’s interest in strengthening ties with India. The United States should redouble its behind-the-scenes efforts to promote a settlement on Kashmir, and it should pressure India to make credible assurances that its large presence in Afghanistan will not harm Pakistan. Doing this would demonstrate that the U.S. can balance its interests in India with Pakistan’s security needs.

Pakistan Should Not Be Used Against Iran

“You need to get out of this Iran phobia,” the Lahore industrialist Babar Ali told us. Babar Ali argued that greater trade and economic cooperation between Pakistan and Iran could help defuse Sunni-Sh’ia conflict in Pakistan, which supplies an ideological impetus for Pakistani jihadi groups that threaten U.S. interests Pakistan and Iran were partners with the United States during the 1950s, but the two countries have diverged profoundly. Relations have been strained by the rise of Sunni fundamentalism in Pakistan, with its strong anti-Sh’ia component. Many Pakistanis believe that a proxy battle between Saudi Arabia, through Sunni militants, and Iran, through Sh’ia militants, is being fought on their soil.

At the state level, Iran has supported the Persian-speaking Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, while Pakistan has sided with Pashtun groups, including the Taliban during its years in power. Additionally, both countries contain restive Baluch minorities, in the adjoining provinces of Sistan in Iran and Baluchistan in Pakistan. Iran now fears Baluch attacks from Pakistani soil.

Certain hard-line U.S. analysts have long argued that the United States should support Baluch separatists in Iran as part of a program of pressure for Iranian regime change. This is not a good idea; many Pakistanis believe that U.S. support for Baluch separatists would also include support for the Baluch movement in Pakistan. (Indeed, many Pakistanis...
believe that the United States is already furtively assisting Baluch separatists. This is an issue that needs to be addressed if the relationship is going to move beyond the current trust deficit.) Ethnic rivalry poses an explosive risk throughout the region, and the tactic of offering support to an insurgency in the name of weakening an unfriendly regime has historically led to damaging blowback against the United States. By contrast, the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline would run through both Sistan in Iran and Baluchistan in Pakistan, and would give both countries an interest in settling long-standing tensions with their Baluch minorities.

Conclusion

The primary conclusion of this report is that strengthening democratic institutions in Pakistan will strengthen security—for the Pakistani state, for Pakistanis, and for the United States. In crafting a new partnership, the United States’ guiding principle should be its support for broader reform forces throughout Pakistani society that are demanding political development as well as economic uplift.

Over Pakistan’s 61 years as an independent state, eight elected presidents, ten parliaments, and more than a dozen prime ministers have been removed from power. The parliament that was replaced after elections in February 2008 was the first to serve a full five-year term. Pakistan’s politicians have been vilified as ineffectual, but they have never fully participated in a political process that forces them to rely on the consent of those they govern, because their tenure has always been cut short by the military.

It is little wonder that the regional, ideological, and sectarian components of Pakistani society have been spun into disparate and rival forces, rather than been woven together in a pluralist society. To bolster their authority in an unstable system, governments, especially military governments, have resorted to the ideological appeal of political Islam; to the muscle of an expanding security apparatus; and to the threat of foreign invasion.

The U.S. government should make very clear that it wants an alliance with Pakistan—not just with the Pakistani military or a single politician or political party. Any sustainable partnership between the United States and Pakistan must deliver the social and economic benefits across Pakistani society that are necessary if political development is to be sustained. Pakistani voters will increasingly hold their government to account on bread-and-butter issues; and delivering benefits there will help secure the state’s contract with its people. Additionally, the military’s consent to a subordinate role in a democratic state will be more easily sustained if it is assured that a growing economic pie will allow it to meet its budgetary needs.
Former foreign minister Kasuri told Network 20/20 that Pakistan should be at the top of the next U.S. president’s foreign policy agenda. “I wish the new U.S. president would take up the issue in his first year,” he said. With the passage of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Kasuri could get his wish. But the legislation must be promptly and effectively implemented and it must be followed by large scale and sustained support from the Friends of Pakistan group of countries. Economic, social, and political development should not be sidelined as security priorities assert themselves in Washington. Neither country has much margin for error.
Recommendations

Network 20/20’s specific recommendations are:

To the Next U.S. Administration

- The next U.S. president should weigh the tactical gains from air strikes, military incursions, and detentions in Pakistan against the longer-term harm they do to our alliance with Islamabad.

- Energy security for Pakistan should be a U.S. priority, because energy shortages are a major cause of instability and an impediment to economic growth. To this end, the United States will need to be flexible on issues such as the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline and civilian nuclear cooperation, which could be negotiated in parallel with U.S. efforts to bring Pakistan into nuclear non-proliferation agreements.

- The United States should work to mitigate the rivalry between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan and toward a settlement of the two countries’ dispute over Kashmir.

- U.S. support for Iranian insurgents based in Pakistan would have destabilizing effects throughout the region. The United States should not embark on any such program.

- While the progress of political negotiations with Islamist militants is so far not evident, the United States should not unequivocally reject this option. The United States should coordinate its counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan with Pakistani efforts to stem insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas bordering Afghanistan. A joint aid and reconstruction program for Pashtun areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan should be considered by the U.S. and other countries in the Friends of Pakistan group.

To the U.S. Department of State and USAID

- The substantial increase in non-military U.S. assistance for Pakistan contained in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act should not be spread too thinly over the 13 separate areas identified in the new legislation, which range from irrigation to development of legal and judicial systems. Instead, the aid should be concentrated on three or four areas. Which areas take priority should be determined in partnership with Pakistani institutions and with the members of the Friends of Pakistan donor group.
In addition to emergency food aid, the United States should provide emergency aid to the hundreds of thousands of persons displaced by Pakistani and U.S. military actions against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the North-West Frontier Province, and Baluchistan. This should be approached with the same urgency as the successful U.S. relief effort after the earthquake in Pakistan’s northern areas in 2005.

The United States should take care that airlifts of American wheat do not economically undercut Pakistan’s own food production. Longer-term cooperation on water supply and irrigation as well as development of agricultural extension services and extension of micro-credit facilities to the poorest Pakistanis in rural areas are also vitally needed.

The United States should also focus on increasing Pakistan’s law enforcement capacity. Unfortunately, all the counter-terrorism aid during the Musharraf years went to the Pakistan army, and the Pakistan police failed to control the expansion of Islamist extremist violence due to their lack of resources and equipment. Better local police forces will provide more security to the people of Pakistan, and if it is publicly known that U.S. help made it possible, the U.S. image in Pakistan will improve.

To the U.S. Congress

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act should be passed and signed into law quickly. It should also fund the creation of an advisory body of Pakistanis from government and civil society to plan its implementation, to evaluate the aid program and to prevent corruption. This body should meet regularly with representatives of the United States, and its findings should be disclosed publicly.

The uncoupling of civilian aid from sanctions, as proposed in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, would neutralize a well-founded Pakistani fear that the United States is mostly interested in supporting military governments in Pakistan. This provision of the act should be retained.

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act should require certification that Pakistan’s security forces are not aiding or otherwise working with armed Pakistani Islamist groups that have been identified by the State Department as terrorist organizations. As it is now written, the act conditions military aid on certification that Pakistan’s security forces are not aiding al-Qaeda or the Taliban, but makes no mention of Pakistani jihadi organizations.
• The use of private U.S.-based contractors, acting through local NGOs, to deliver aid has been severely criticized, most recently by Richard Holbrooke before Congress. In Afghanistan, we have little to show for aid that has been handled by such contractors, and we should avoid repeating the mistake in Pakistan, where there are credible public and private organizations and NGOs that the United States can deal with directly.

To International Donors and NGOs

• Exchanges between Pakistani NGOs and the more robust NGO networks in other South Asian countries, especially Bangladesh, should be supported.

• The Fulbright scholarship program and other people-to-people exchanges from the United States are constrained by our government’s security concerns. Non-government support should be increased for American individuals and institutions that assess risks on the basis of their own criteria and are willing to assume such risks.
Appendix A

Network 20/20 Mission Statement

Preparing Future Leaders
to Shape the Global Security Debate

Five years from now, when business leaders
and policymakers from the United States and the Islamic world
sit down at the negotiating table,
will they meet as strangers or as associates with
a history of cooperation?

Network 20/20 is an independent, non-profit organization that helps prepare the next generation of leaders in the United States to participate meaningfully in the promotion of entrepreneurial diplomacy and global security. We do this by means of lectures and study groups here at home and field research overseas. Our aim is to better understand on-the-ground realities in countries of global importance. The published research resulting from these trips is circulated to the U.S. government, private-sector policymakers, and NGOs.

Network 20/20 fills two major gaps in U.S. foreign policy: lack of participation and lack of serious input from civil society in general. Network 20/20 provides a unique forum for early and mid-career individuals to share and explore experiences and ideas drawn from the real world of private citizenry. This exchange refines members’ understanding of foreign policy and helps channel their constructive engagement with policymakers.

Network 20/20 members are a talented, diverse, and multilingual group that includes foreign nationals living in the United States. Our members come from business, the professions, the media, NGOs, think tanks, government, and academia; two-thirds have advanced degrees. What draws them together is that they are all “thinking,” motivated individuals who are volunteering significant time and energy in furthering America’s positive engagement with the world.
Appendix B

Entrepreneurial Diplomacy Program

In 2004, Network 20/20 launched its Entrepreneurial Diplomacy Program in an effort to connect young private-sector leaders from the United States with their counterparts in other countries. Network 20/20 is building a broad network of influential private citizens that will generate concrete, actionable ideas to enhance international security and prosperity. The organization pursues this goal through study, dialogue, and field research in regions of global security importance. Network 20/20 has a special interest in building bridges with our peers in the Islamic world. In the past years Network 20/20 has taken field research trips to Turkey, Poland, Iran, and Pakistan.

Network 20/20 members have proved to be effective interlocutors with policymakers, providing fresh insights from professionals who are highly motivated about the issues they address and who have thriving careers outside the foreign policy sphere.

Iran

In the fall of 2006, Network 20/20 members took the unusual step of fielding two delegations to Iran to gain firsthand knowledge of this important country and to build bridges with their counterparts there. We discovered that the desire for more contact is widespread in Iran, and we recognized that more detailed understanding of Iran’s politics, history, and current conditions is vitally needed if the significant strands of Iranian society that are open to establishing constructive relations with the United States are to be effectively engaged. In two separate 10-day trips to Iran, Network 20/20 conducted more than 50 interviews in 6 cities and several villages with a cross-section of Iranian society.

We learned that nationalist sentiment is shared by Iranians across the political spectrum. Iran’s nuclear program is largely viewed as a sign of prestige rather than as a military strategy. Even opponents of the clerical and security establishments object to coercive U.S. diplomacy and the threat of military force. While Western analysts see a crude division between “reformists” and “conservatives,” the reality is far more nuanced, and alignments and ideology can be fluid. Network 20/20 generated 12 specific recommendations for the U.S. government, Congress, NGOs, media, universities, and private citizens.

The trip resulted in the report Reframing Iran: Views from the Field, which was widely disseminated not only to our membership but also to private- and public-sector leaders. We sent more than 100 copies to Congress, as requested. Translated into Farsi, the report was circulated in Iran. It was also posted on our Web site.
Pakistan

A Network 20/20 delegation visited Pakistan in May 2008, to seek frank exchanges and to build bridges with our counterparts. The delegation had three goals: 1) to acquire a better understanding of Pakistan and Pakistani views of the war on terrorism and the danger of nuclear proliferation; 2) to gain insights into the impact of the on-again, off-again nature of Pakistani-U.S. bilateral relations; and 3) to make concrete recommendations at a time when the United States is pledging to strengthen its alliances across Pakistani society, not just with the military.

In a 10-day trip to Pakistan, flanked by side trips to Afghanistan and India, Network 20/20 conducted more than 60 interviews in Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Multan, Rawalpindi, Kabul, and New Delhi. Interviewees represented a cross-section of Pakistani society ranging from government officials, members of parliament, military officers, university chancellors, and business executives, to religious leaders, radical Islamists, journalists, non-profit community organizers, scientists, entrepreneurs, and people on the street. Many interviewees spoke English; Network 20/20’s Urdu-speaking members conversed with those who did not.

The project resulted in the report presented above, which is being disseminated to public and private policymakers, donors, NGOs, members of Congress, and presidential candidates.

Lena Sene
Acting Chairman, Entrepreneurial Diplomacy Program

A 2006-07 White House Fellow, Lena Sene is a founding member of Network 20/20 and a member of its Board of Directors. She is studying at Harvard Business School. Prior to her work at the White House, Sene was an investment representative at Lehman Brothers, where she advised entrepreneurs and CEOs of publicly traded companies on a full range of investment strategies. Before that, she was a private banker at JPMorgan Chase, where she was selected as the sole recipient of the annual JPMorgan Rising Star Award for the Annual Women’s Bond Club Merit Award Dinner in 2003. Sene holds NASD Securities Licenses 7 and 63. She is a Board member of the UN Association of New York and a member of the Economic Club of New York. Born in the United States, Sene was raised in Senegal, Russia, and Ukraine and is fluent in English, French, Russian, and Wolof.
Appendix C

Network 20/20 Pakistan Project Team

Imtiaz Ali
Imtiaz Ali is a Pakistan-based journalist working as a special correspondent for the Washington Post and a Pakistani TV channel. He reported for the BBC on the U.S. attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in the wake of September 11th. Ali has also worked with Pakistan's premier English-language newspapers, The News and Dawn. Since 2002, Ali has reported extensively on the Taliban, militancy in the border regions, and Pakistan's military operations against al-Qaeda operatives and their local supporters in the tribal areas along the Afghan border. His writings have appeared in London's Daily Telegraph and on the Web site of the Washington, D.C.-based Jamestown Foundation. Born and raised in a traditional Pashtun family in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province, Ali earned his master's degrees in journalism and political science from the University of Peshawar. He was a Knight Journalism Fellow at Stanford and is a 2008 Yale World Fellow--a global leadership program at Yale University.

George Billard
George Billard is a Network 20/20 Board member and a filmmaker based in New York City. He is president of Do Diligence, a film production company with productions in more than 30 countries, including Mongolia, Japan, Peru, French Polynesia, Australia, Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, and Chile’s Easter Island. He is also president of Miracle Media, where he produced and directed The Well-Seasoned Traveler for the A&E television network. Billard has created a library of motion picture imagery that is distributed internationally. He has a B.A. in broadcast and film from Boston University, and in 2005 he earned an M.P.A. from Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.

Tai-Heng Cheng
Professor Tai-Heng Cheng is Associate Director of the Center for International Law at New York Law School, and Of Counsel to the law firm Hoguet Newman Regal & Kenney, LLP. He is Honorary Fellow of the Foreign Policy Association, Member of the Academic Council of the Institute for Transnational Arbitration, and Member of the Awards Committee of the American Society of International Law. Professor Cheng is also a member of the American Arbitration Association international panel, and the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution panel. He has been a visiting professor at the City University of Hong Kong and Sarah Lawrence College, and was formerly associated with the law firm Simpson Thacher & Barlett LLP. Professor Cheng holds a Doctor of the Science of Law degree and a Master of Laws degree from Yale Law School, where he was a Howard M. Holtzman Fellow for International Law. He also holds an M.A. degree and a law degree with first-class honors from Oxford University, where he was an Oxford University Scholar.
Patricia S. Huntington
For more than 20 years, Patricia S. Huntington has advised grant makers in foreign policy, international development programs, and strategic philanthropy. Her clients have included American Express, the Ford Foundation, and the Sumitomo Corporation.

Prior to founding Network 20/20, Dr. Huntington directed a Rockefeller Foundation field research project in 11 countries on four continents. Dr. Huntington reported the results in a position paper, “Landmines and U.S. Leadership: A View from the Field.” She also created an educational CD-ROM on global humanitarian mine clearance entitled “Landmines: Clearing the Way,” which has been disseminated widely throughout the world.

Dr. Huntington is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Women’s Foreign Policy Group, Women in International Security, and the Foreign Policy Association’s Off-the-Record Lecture Series. She is a member of the Board of the Fund for Peace and sits on the advisory board of New York Law School’s Center for International Law.

She earned a summa cum laude for her Smith College undergraduate work on British imperialism in southern Africa, an M.A. in African history from UCLA, and an Ed.D. from Rutgers University.

Abid H. Imam
Recently an attorney at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman in New York, Abid H. Imam has provided services to Legal Aid and is a member of the Asia Society. While obtaining his J.D. from Columbia School of Law, he focused on international trade law. As an undergraduate at Yale University, Imam studied Middle Eastern and South Asian history and politics. Born and raised in Pakistan, Imam belongs to a political family committed to electoral politics. His mother served as the ambassador to the United States, and both his parents and sister have been elected to the local, provincial, and national tiers of the legislature.

Glenn Johnston
Glenn Johnston is a director of business research for Kroll—one of the world’s leading risk consulting companies—and is head of business development for the North America region. Before joining Kroll, he held director-level positions at the law firms of Loeb & Loeb and Covington & Burling. Earlier in his career, Johnston was a financial journalist and worked in London and New York. He also spent four years as a public affairs officer with the United Nations, where he was assigned to the General Assembly’s Legal Committee and the Security Council. Johnston has a law degree from Trinity College, Dublin.
Clark Lombardi
An expert in Islamic legal systems, Professor Lombardi teaches constitutional, comparative, and development law at the University of Washington Law School. Professor Lombardi focuses on the way constitutional systems deal with religious organizations and religious law.

In 2006, he published *State Law as Islamic Law in Modern Egypt: The Incorporation of Shari`a into Egyptian Constitutional Law*. Professor Lombardi was named a Carnegie Scholar for 2006-08, allowing him to study judicial opinions in three non-Arab Muslim countries: Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Malaysia. As a Carnegie Scholar, he is researching how past judges have interpreted Islamic law and how modern judges who are trained in the Western legal tradition are interpreting Islamic law. From his research, he will produce a book and a website.

Andy McCord
Andy McCord is a freelance writer who specializes in the politics and culture of South Asia. He has an A.B. in the Study of Religions from Harvard College. He reported on the 1988 elections in Pakistan for the U.S. weekly *India Abroad* and for the Indo-Asian News Service. In 1996, he was a senior Fulbright scholar based in Lahore. He has visited Pakistan often in connection with a biography he is preparing of Pakistani poet and dissident intellectual Faiz Ahmed Faiz, for which he has received a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities. His writings on South Asian politics have appeared in the *Nation*, *Dawn* (Karachi), *Verve* (Bombay), the *Journal of Asian Studies*, the *Hindu*, and other publications. As a translator, he contributed to the *New York Times* project in 2002 analyzing notebooks and other materials found by Times reporters in al-Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan.

Madiha R. Tahir
Madiha R. Tahir received her master’s degree in Near Eastern studies from NYU. She is fluent in Urdu and Hindi and has a working knowledge of Arabic. Born in Pakistan, Tahir immigrated to the United States with her family for political asylum and continues to be active in the Pakistani immigrant community. She has contributed freelance work for various documentary projects and is an advanced M.S. student at the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism. Tahir retains a keen interest in reporting on Pakistani politics and American foreign policy in the region.
Appendix D

Select List of Persons Interviewed in Pakistan

Academia

Sarwat Ali  
Professor of Musicology  
National College of Arts

Pervez Hoodbhoy  
Chairman  
Department of Physics  
Quid-e-Azam University

Nasira Iqbal  
Retired Judge  
Lahore High Court  
Adjunct Professor of Law and Gender Studies  
University of the Punjab

Osama Siddique  
Head  
Department of Law and Policy  
Lahore University of Management Sciences

Business/Entrepreneurship

Syed Babar Ali  
Founder  
Founder  
Lahore University of Management Sciences

Amin Hashwani  
Executive  
Hashwani Group

Danial Kasuri  
Founder  
Beaconhouse Group

Mian Shahwanaz  
Section Head, Administrative Services  
Beaconhouse Group
### Government

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Owais Ahmand Ghani</td>
<td>Governor North-West Frontier Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Husain Haqqani</td>
<td>Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador Abida Hussain</td>
<td>Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syed Fakhar Imam</td>
<td>Former Speaker National Assembly of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahsan Iqbal</td>
<td>Member National Assembly of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Information Secretary Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamran Khan</td>
<td>Member National Assembly of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shah Mehmood Qureishi</td>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nafisa Shah</td>
<td>Former Nazim Khairpur District</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member National Assembly of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Politicians, Lawyers, Judges

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salahuddin Ahmed</td>
<td>Junior Partner Malik, Chaudhry, Ahmed, and Siddiqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitzaz Ahsan</td>
<td>President Supreme Court Bar Association, Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Liaqat Baloch
Naib Ameer
Jamaat-e-Islami, Pakistan

Ameer
Jamaat-e-Islami, Punjab

Justice Rana Bhagwandas
Retired Justice
Supreme Court of Pakistan

Chaudhry Pervaiz Elahi
Punjab President
Pakistan Muslim League
(Quaid-i-Azam)

Leader of Opposition
National Assembly of Pakistan

Khurshid Kasuri
Former Foreign Minister
Pakistan Government

Barrister of Law
Gray's Inn London

Muneer A. Malik
Former President
Supreme Court Bar Association, Pakistan

Maulvi Omar
Spokesman
Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan

Syed Sajjad Ali Shah
Former Chief Justice
Pakistan Supreme Court

Jiang Yili
Counselor
Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Pakistan

Media

Mazhar Abbas
Deputy Director
ARY One World Television

Secretary-General
Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists

Khaled Ahmed
Editor
Friday Times
Fatima Bhutto  
*Author*

“Whispers in the Desert” and “8:50 a.m. 8 October 2005”

*Member*

Pakistan People's Party (Shaheed Bhutto Group)

Syed Talat Hussain  
*Director of News*

Aaj Television

Jugnu Mohsin  
*Publisher and Director*

The Friday Times

Ahmed Rashid  
*Author*

“Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia” and “Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia”

Beena Sarwar  
*Founding Editor*

The News on Sunday, Pakistan

*Former Features Editor*

The Frontier Post, Lahore

*Fellow*

Ash Center for Democratic Governance
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

Ikram Sehgal  
*Publisher and Managing Editor*

Defense Journal of Pakistan

Najam Sethi  
*Editor-in-Chief*

Daily Times

*Editor-in-Chief*

Friday Times

Rahimullah Yusufzai  
*Executive Editor*

The News, Peshawar
NGO, Religion, and Culture

Samina Ahmed  Project Director
South Asia Program
International Crisis Group

Asma Jahangir  Chairperson
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Mukhtar Mai  Founder
Mukhtar Mai Women’s Welfare Organization

Tayab Mir  Incharge (P&P)
Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation

Lauren Mueenuddin  Deputy Chief of Party
Pakistan Initiative for Mothers and Newborns (PAIMAN)

Taimur Mueenuddin  Senior Health Officer
UNICEF

Kishwar Naheed  Poet and Women's Rights Activist

A.H. Nayyar  Senior Research Fellow
Sustainable Development Policy Institute

Adam Nayyar  Executive Director
Pakistan National Council of the Arts
Ministry of Culture
Government of Pakistan

I. A. Rehman  Director
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan

Muddassir Rizvi  Director
Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN)

Zeba Sathar  Country Director
Population Council

Amir Siddique  Naib Imam
The “Red Mosque,” Islamabad
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tasneem Siddiqui</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orangi Pilot Project</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Former Chief Secretary</td>
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<td></td>
<td>and Director-General</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Sindh Katchi Abadi Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>Major General Athar Abbas</td>
<td>Director General</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inter Services Public Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigadier Muhammad Tariq Ali</td>
<td>Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter Services Public Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant General Hamid Gul</td>
<td>Retired Lieutenant General</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nur Ahmed</td>
<td>Peshawar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammad Amin</td>
<td>Trader, Khyber Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muhammad Arshad, 22</td>
<td>MA Student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree College of Muzaffargarh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amtazullah Khan</td>
<td>Student, Khyber Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imtiaz</td>
<td>Trader, Peshawar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malik Sajjid</td>
<td>Shopkeeper, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sangeen Shah</td>
<td>Flour Merchant, Peshawar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man, 18</td>
<td>Student, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman, 20s</td>
<td>Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man, late 20s</td>
<td>Tailor, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman, 50s</td>
<td>Lower Middle Class Punjabi, Lahore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man, 30s</td>
<td>Cobbler, Lahore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Man, late 30s  
**Tennis Coach, Islamabad**

Man, 40s  
**Educated Bookstore Employee, Islamabad**

Man, 30s  
**Hotel Kitchen Staff, Peshawar**

Man, 40s  
**Peshawar**

Woman, 20s  
**Burka-Clad Mother with 6 Children, Multan**

Man, 40s  
**Bearded Tribal Leader, FATA**

Man, 40s  
**Businessman, Khyber Pass**

Man, 20s  
**Vendor, Khyber Pass**

**United States Government**

Elizabeth O. Colton  
**Press Attaché**  
*Embassy of the United States in Pakistan*

Antone C. Greubel  
**Political and Economic Officer**  
*Consulate of the United States in Pakistan*

Ambassador Anne Woods Patterson  
**United States Ambassador to Pakistan**
Appendix E

Persons Interviewed in India and Afghanistan

**Government**

Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon | Foreign Secretary  
| Government of India  

Former High Commissioner to Pakistan  
| Government of India  

Withheld | Western Diplomat in his 50s  
| Kabul  

**NGO, Religion and Culture**

Sophie Barry | Reporting and Communications Officer  
| Development Assistance International Kabul  

**Media**

Praful Bidwai | Former Editor  
| The Times, India  

Columnist  
| The Hindu  

Masood Farivar | Radio Journalist  
| Internews, Kabul  

Peter Jouvenal | Former BBC Cameraman  
| Proprietor Gandomack Guest House, Kabul
Appendix F

Persons Interviewed in the United States

Academia

Hassan Abbas  
Research Fellow  
International Security Program  
Belfer Center  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University

Xenia Dormandy  
Director  
Project on India and the Subcontinent  
Belfer Center  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University

Husain Haqqani  
Associate Professor  
Boston University

Ambassador Maleeha Lodhi  
Fellow  
Institute of Politics  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University  
Former Ambassador of Pakistan to the United States  
Former Ambassador of Pakistan to Great Britain  
Editor  
The News International, Pakistan

Appu Soman  
Research Fellow  
International Security Program  
Project on Managing the Atom  
Belfer Center  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University

Sasha Talcott  
Director of Communications and Outreach  
Belfer Center  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University
Sharon Robertson Wilke  
*Associate Director of Communications*
*Belfer Center*
*John F. Kennedy School of Government*
*Harvard University*

**Government**

H.E. Mr. Munir Akram  
*Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations*

M. Aslam Chaudhry  
*Senior Interregional Adviser (Water)*
*Division for Sustainable Development*
*Department of Economic and Social Affairs*

Ahmad Raza Khan Qasuri  
*Senior Advocate*
*Supreme Court of Pakistan*

Shah Mahmood Qureishi  
*Foreign Minister*
*Government of Pakistan*

**Politicians, Lawyers, Judges**

Aitzaz Ahsan  
*President*
*Supreme Court Bar Association, Pakistan*

Imran Khan  
*Chairman*
*Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)*

**NGO, Religion, and Culture**

Salman Ahmad  
*Rock Musician, Junoon*

Craig Cohen  
*Deputy Chief of Staff and Fellow*
*Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project*
*International Security Program*
*Center for Strategic & International Studies*

Stephen Cohen  
*Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies*
*The Brookings Institution*

Lisa Curtis  
*Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center*
*The Heritage Foundation*
Philip Gordon
Senior Fellow, U.S. Foreign Policy
The Brookings Institution

Frédéric Grare
Visiting Scholar
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Paul D. Hughes
Executive Director
The Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

Ambassador Ahmad Kamal
Senior Fellow
Institute of Training and Research
United Nations

Michael Krepon
Co-Founder
Henry L. Stimson Center

Daniel Markey
Senior Fellow, India, Pakistan, and South Asia Council on Foreign Relations

Fawzia Naqvi
Vice President
Soros Economic Development Fund

Vali R. Nasr
Professor of International Relations
The Fletcher School
Tufts University
Adjunct Senior Fellow
Middle Eastern Studies
Council on Foreign Relations

Trita Parsi
President
National Iranian American Council

Bruce Riedel
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies
Saban Center for Middle East Policy
The Brookings Institution

Marvin Weinbaum
Scholar-in-Residence
Public Policy Center
Middle East Institute
Appendix G

Background Meetings and Briefings

2007

May 11
Pakistan Update
Council on Foreign Relations
Husain Haqqani
Director, Department of International Relations, Boston University
Daniel Markey
Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations

August 15
A Conversation with Benazir Bhutto
Council on Foreign Relations
Benazir Bhutto
Former Prime Minister, Pakistan and Chairman, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)

August 23
Pakistan: Nuclear Non-proliferation, Land Reform, and Military Reduction
Zia Mian
Research Assistant, the Program on Science and Global Security and Lecturer, Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

September 18
Schooling Islam: The Culture and Politics of Modern Muslim Education
Carnegie Council
Robert W. Hefner
Professor and Director of Graduate Admission, Department of Anthropology, Boston University
Muhammad Qasim Zaman
Professor, Near Eastern Studies and Religion, Princeton University

September 24
Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy
Network 20/20
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha
Independent Security Analyst and Author

October 3
U.S.-Pakistan Relations: An Update
Council on Foreign Relations
Riaz Mohammad Khan
Foreign Secretary, Pakistan
October 3
*Education, Energy and Jobs for All*
Network 20/20
Husain Haqqani
Director, Department of International Relations, Boston University

October 9
*Implications of the Changing Balance of Power in the Middle East*
Council on Foreign Relations
Jon Alterman
Director and Senior Fellow, Middle East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
F. Gregory Gause
Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Vermont
Vali R. Nasr
Professor of International Politics, The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Adjunct Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

October 12
*Double-Edged Sword: Nuclear Diplomacy in Unequal Conflicts*
Harvard University
Appu Soman
Research Fellow, International Security Program and Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

*Advancing Against Nuclear Terrorism*
Harvard University
Sasha Talcott
Director of Communications and Outreach, Belfer Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

*India-Pakistan Terrorism*
Harvard University
Xenia Dormandy
Director, Project on India and the Subcontinent, Belfer Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

*Pakistan’s Nuclear Program and “Islam and the West”*
Harvard University
Hassan Abbas
Research Fellow, Project on Managing the Atom and International Security Program, Belfer Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

November 6
*Pakistan at 60: Continuity and Change*
Network 20/20
Ayesha Jalal
Professor of History, Tufts University
November 30
*Pakistan Today: The Musharraf Government Makes Its Case*
Asia Society
Nasim Ashraf
Minister of State, Government of Pakistan
Chairman, National Commission for Human Development, Pakistan
Mohammad Ali Saif
Minister of Tourism and Youth Affairs, Government of Pakistan
Kashmala Tariq
Former Member, Standing Committees of Pakistan on Law, Justice, and Human Rights; Commerce and Trade; Finance and Revenue; Price Control; and Rules and Procedures, National Assembly of Pakistan
Nicholas Platt
President Emeritus, Asia Society

December 12
*Pakistan: The Struggle between Politics and Extremism*
Carnegie Council
Ahmed Rashid
Author, *Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and, Fundamentalism in Central Asia and Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia*

December 17
*Will There Be a Soft Landing for Pakistan?*
Council on Foreign Relations
Hassan Abbas
Research Fellow, International Security Program, Belfer Center, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

December 20
*Guiding Democracy in Pakistan: Has the International Community Failed?*
The Century Foundation
Hina Jilani
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Morton H. Halperin
Director of U.S. Advocacy, Open Society Institute

2008

January 16
*Pakistan: The January Elections, Musharraf, and U.S. Relations*
Off-The-Record Lecture Series, Foreign Policy Association
Ambassador Frank G. Wisner
Vice Chairman, External Affairs, AIG and Former United States Ambassador to India
January 25
*Elections vs. Democracy: Post-Bhutto Pakistan and the International Community*
The Century Foundation
Imran Khan
Chairman, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)

February 6
*The Growing Crises in Afghanistan and Pakistan: New Challenges for U.S. Policy*
Council on Foreign Relations
Mumtaz Ahmad
Professor of Political Science, Hampton University
J. Alexander Thier
Senior Rule of Law Adviser, U.S. Institute of Peace

February 25
*Afghanistan and Pakistan*
Council on Foreign Relations
Senator Joseph R. Biden
U.S. Senator Delaware (D)

February 29
*Security and Development in Pakistan's Tribal Areas*
Council on Foreign Relations
Javed Iqbal
Civil Service of Pakistan

March 4
*Pakistan: Yesterday, Today, and the Future*
Women’s International Forum
Ambassador Ahmad Kamal
Senior Fellow, Institute of Training and Research, United Nations

March 5
*Dubai and the Emerging Economies of the Persian Gulf: Prospects and Threats*
Council on Foreign Relations
Fareed Mohamedi
Partner and Head of Markets and Country Strategies Group, PFC Energy
Jean-Francois Seznec
Visiting Associate Professor

March 5
*Pakistan’s Role in Regional and Global Stability*
The Pluralism Fund
Ambassador Munir Akram
Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations
March 14-15
Global Action Forum: Arab and American Dialogue
Young Arab Leaders
Sayyeda Mirza Jafri
Network 20/20 Member and Project Manager, One Nation - With Liberty and Justice for All

March 19
Education in Pakistan: What Works & Why
Center for Strategic & International Studies
Abbas Rashid
Coordinator of the Open Society Institute-funded study “Education in Pakistan: What Works and Why”
Campaign for Quality Education
Irfan Muzaffar
Educator associated with USAID Education Reform Assistance Program
Anjum Halai
Head of Research and Policy Studies and Associate Professor at Aga Khan University Institute for Educational Development

April 4
Pakistan Political Developments since the Elections
Network 20/20
Ali Ahsan
Associate Officer and Speechwriter, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations

April 17
The Commercialization of Microfinance: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Council on Foreign Relations
Mary Ellen Iskenderian
President and CEO, Women’s World Banking
Roshaneh Zafar
Founder and President, The Kashf Foundation (Pakistan)

June 2
Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia
Network 20/20
Ahmed Rashid
Author

July 8
Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within
Council on Foreign Relations
Shuja Nawaz
Author
July 10
Afghanistan and Pakistan: States of Uncertainty
Network 20/20
Barnett R. Rubin
Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

August 11
Pakistan’s Transition to Democracy: Lessons from the Lawyers Movement
Network 20/20
Aitzaz Ahsan
President, Supreme Court Bar Association, Pakistan
Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of Pakistan
Appendix H

Further Reading


