

TALKING TURKEY:

A PRIVATE PERSPECTIVE ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

A Network 20/20 initiative to reach out to our counterparts in the Islamic world

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Iraq war of 2003 triggered a surge of anti-Americanism in Turkey and strained relations between the two governments. The U.S. invasion was deeply unpopular among Turks, a third of whom believe that the United States is the world's greatest threat to global peace, according to a recent poll. In the spring of 2004, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan went so far as to accuse the U.S. of state terrorism in Iraq. In short, after a half century the special bond between Turkey and the United States seemed to be fraying.

In October 2004, a Network 20/20 delegation went to Turkey with three goals in mind:

- 1) Acquire a better understanding of Turkish-U.S. bilateral relations
- 2) Gain insights into Turkey's aspirations for European Union (EU) accession and its role in the greater Middle East; and
- 3) Make concrete recommendations for improving U.S.-Turkish relations.

After an intensive week of meetings in Istanbul and Ankara with senior government officials, military officers, business leaders, journalists, scholars, Islamist activists, and representatives from the nonprofit world, we reached certain preliminary conclusions and have the following recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To engage in more effective public diplomacy Americans need to start by listening. Both the U.S. government and U.S. citizens in general should be more sensitive to the Turkish perspective on issues that divide them. Only once these are heard and noted is productive dialogue possible. A nuanced understanding of Turkey and its decision-making process are essential for engaging this complex country.

Turkey is characterized by great regional diversity ranging from the sophisticated upper middle class in Istanbul to the farmers and herders in eastern Anatolia. It is important to be sensitive to how individuals define themselves. As one expert pointed out, a farmer from Nebraska will probably think differently from a businessman from New York City. It is the same in Turkey.

Positive next steps include a series of both official and unofficial visits in which efforts should be made to show concern for the Turkish people. In addition, U.S. diplomats should engage Turkish publishers and journalists in dialogue in order to help stem the growing tide of anti-Americanism.

There should also be more involvement of private-sector groups like Network 20/20 in person-to-person public diplomacy. Such groups are often in a better position than official delegations to engage in meaningful exchanges. As a private group we were able to have very candid conversations with Turkish officials. Anti-U.S. foreign policy has given way to widespread Anti-Americanism in Turkey. Our Turkish hosts did not hesitate to criticize U.S. government actions in the Middle East. But they were unfailingly hospitable to us as private citizens from the United States and other countries.

American diplomats need to use more accurate language when they talk about Turkey. For example, Turkish leaders expressed outrage over Secretary of State Colin Powell's characterization of Turkey as a "Muslim democracy." They asked how Americans would like it if their country was called a Christian democracy. From the Turkish point of view, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk moved religion out of the public sphere in 1923 and Turkey has been a secular state ever since. Even current AKP party leaders who may tout Islam domestically stress Turkey's secularism in their foreign policy because they feel strongly that secularism is the bedrock of Turkey's government and they understand that many in the West associate Islam with terrorism. In response to another frequently mentioned malapropism, many Turkish academics point out that Turkey is not a model for other countries as the U.S. so often claims. "We may serve as a beacon to our neighbors in the region" one university president said, "but the Turkish population mix is unique so we cannot be a model for any other country."

American leaders would do well to frame their decisions in local vernacular whenever possible. For example, instead of saying “the U.S. has decided” one might frame the announcement in terms of what would be beneficial to local people.

The Broader Middle East and North Africa Peace Initiative (BMENA) and other U.S.-sponsored regional programs should be pursued in partnership with local countries and not via fiat. Receiving little support from Europe, BMENA needs all the help it can get from the Arab world. With this in mind, the U.S. should work through existing regional institutions like the Gulf Cooperation Council when possible. For example, the U.S. might ask to be an observer at an upcoming Council meeting where it could plant the seeds for promoting democracy and economic development.

The United States should encourage non-profit organizations to build bridges with civil society in Turkey. The U.S. government’s own efforts at “public diplomacy” have been received skeptically in Turkey and across the Middle East in recent years. We strongly believe that private groups such as Network 20/20 are in a better position to engage in credible public diplomacy that will lay the groundwork for solid bilateral relations as well as fostering mutual understanding among the citizens of both countries. For example, the effects of Network 20/20’s first visit to Turkey are already rippling through American society. The trip report is being circulated to the Network 20/20 membership and advisors, Turkish colleagues, policy makers in the U.S. and Turkey and interested publics in both countries. It is also being posted on the Network 20/20 web site (www.network2020.org). Individual members of the delegation have briefed Wall Street colleagues, law firms, the New York City Bar Association, universities and high schools, diplomatic missions, and international agencies. One 20/20 delegate will return to Turkey early in 2005 to produce a documentary film for PBS. Another delegate will spend the better part of a year in Turkey working with the youth group, ARI, to determine the needs and interests of Turkish youth in both urban and rural areas.

The Network 20/20 Turkish connection continues to thrive and will expand over time. Network 20/20 is creating a directory of Turkish Associates who will be able to communicate directly with Network 20/20 members via the Internet. We anticipate hosting a conference in the U.S. in the near future for Turkish counterparts. Several Turkish leaders who have traveled to the United States since the Network 20/20 trip have offered to address the full membership to keep the dialogue going. We anticipate that such two-way communication will increase in the future.

MAIN FINDINGS

Turkey is becoming increasingly liberal and democratic. In the past two years, Turkey has undertaken the most dramatic economic, political and social reforms since the years following the founding of the Republic in 1923. Motivated largely by the hope of joining the European Union, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government has used its overwhelming parliamentary majority to continue to pass major reform packages started by the previous coalition government. These have reduced the military's influence in government, established strict laws against torture, abolished the death penalty, repealed curbs on free speech, and allowed Kurds and other ethnic groups to broadcast and set up education programs in their own languages. The AKP government has also expanded previous coalition initiatives to deregulate the economy, simplify the tax code, and put Turkey's fiscal house in order.

EU accession has broad based support throughout Turkish society. The reasons are obvious. Turkey already benefits from its free-trade relationship with Europe; more than half of its trade is with European nations. Now that a conditional date for EU negotiations has been set, Turkey can be expected to continue its remarkable economic progress: more than 10% growth in GNP per year and a quadrupling of employment in 2005 according to the European Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). From the United States' perspective, Turkey's growing economic ties with Europe is an extremely positive trend.

In meeting after meeting, Network 20/20 heard the Turkish argument for accession. It goes something like this: In ten years, Turkey will have a population of close to 80 million people with significant purchasing power. Turkish markets offer opportunities for European investors. Turkish workers will supply Europe with needed laborers at a time when Europe's population is shrinking and aging. Turks have ethnic, cultural and religious ties in the Caucasus, East Central Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East that can be used to help secure energy resources and foster trade. "You can buy bread in Turkish from Germany to China," said one Turkish official; "what other country can make such a claim?" Finally, Turks argue that their military will add considerable strength to EU forces. With Turkey on board, they say, the EU can become a global rather than a regional player.

There has been significant progress on the Cyprus issue. Cyprus has long been an impediment to Turkey's hopes for EU accession. But in April 2004, Turkish Cypriots voted for the Annan Peace Plan to re-unify the island, while Greek Cypriots voted against the plan. We understand that this outcome was due in large part to Prime Minister Erdogan's deft diplomacy in the run up to the poll. The EU is currently demanding that

Turkey recognize (Greek) Cyprus as a pre-requisite to accession and has said that it will re-admit (Turkish) northern Cyprus to the international community. However, direct flights are still not permitted and this is a problem in Turkish-EU relations; Turks feel they are not being treated fairly and the Turkish Cypriots do not see any benefit of the yes vote for the Annan plan.

Turkey is a valuable partner in the international community's war against radical Islamist terrorism. The image of the current secular democratic government led by conservatives who are religious has helped soften the edges of Turkey's historically militant secularism and made Turkey more appealing to many Muslims in other countries. In addition, because of its historical ties with Turkic populations from Germany to China, Turkey has some influence by proffering a moderate interpretation of Islam and helping the spread of democracy.

Turkish officials argue that Turkey has been a steady partner of the West in the fight against terrorism. For the past decade Turkey has been fighting its own war on terror by suppressing Kurdish separatist militants. Turkish officials also note that Turkey is helping broker communications between Syria and the United States, sharing intelligence on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, and working with Western nations to combat the terrorist threat posed by the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).

Turkey is helping to stabilize the region. As part of its quest for EU accession, Turkey has been forging positive ties with its neighbors. Turkey has increased its trade with Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Syria, and Greece, where Prime Minister Erdogan and Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis have developed a close personal friendship. Turkey and Armenia are finally starting to talk about normalizing their relations. And because of its ethnic, linguistic and religious ties with every country in Central Asia, Turkey is a natural partner for investment in energy projects and other businesses.

ISSUES AND CONCERNS

The Iraq war has brought Turkey in conflict with the U.S., Israel and the Iraqi Kurds. Turks express a litany of complaints about the U.S., including its failure to pay Turkey promised damages incurred in the first Iraq war, the lack of notification about invasion plans and timing in the second Iraq war, the deaths of its truck drivers carrying goods to Iraq, and what is seen as America embracing the Iraqi Kurds. Northern Iraq is currently a safe haven for Kurdish separatist militants of the PKK, whom Turkish officials and other establishment figures characterize as “vicious terrorists.” Most important, Turkish leaders from all segments of society see the U.S. as the problem in Iraq, not the solution. There is always a price to pay when you pull out a gun, they say. They maintain that the U.S. has lost the credibility to bring about a peaceful solution because of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal; the collateral damage incurred by the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq; and the military’s failure to win the hearts and minds of the people. Turks were particularly upset by the U.S. bombing of a Turkmen city caught in the cross fire in northern Iraq in September 2004. They recognize that the collapse of Iraq could lead to horrendous regional conflict but they want stability achieved by the United Nations, not a predominantly American force.

Turkish military involvement in Iraq is not out of the question. If Turkish citizens believe that the Turkmen community in Kirkuk is in danger, the Turkish military would be strongly tempted to intervene in northern Iraq regardless of U.S. strategy. Such action would be a major setback to EU negotiations even if tolerated by Americans. As a counterbalance to this threat, it is important to note that Turkish business in Iraq is booming. The more Turkish companies invest in northern Iraq, the fewer reasons Turkish or Iraqi Kurdish politicians have to disrupt the status quo. From the Iraqi Kurdish point of view, Turkey is a natural export outlet: Iraqi Kurdish exports, including their major oil pipeline, transit Turkey to the Mediterranean, so it is also in the Iraqi Kurdish interest not to rock the boat.

Some circles in Ankara believe that Israel, its long-time ally and trading partner, has been encouraging Iraqi Kurds to form their own independent state that would be a new ally for Israel in the region but a threat to Turkey whose Kurdish population might renew their separatist claims. Turkish Foreign Minister Gul has been quoted in the American press as accusing Israel of providing military training to Iraqi Kurds. In an effort to offset this threat Turkey has recently made overtures to Iran, which has problems with its own Kurdish population. In 2003 there were four high-level visits by Turkish leaders to Iran and six return visits by their Iranian counterparts.

Turkish officials complain that they are experiencing weekly attacks from PKK militants

based in Iraq. They point out that the U.S. State Department recognizes the PKK as a terrorist organization. Yet when Turkey asks why U.S. forces don't root out the PKK, American officials reply the U.S. military's hands are full. Turks understand that the Iraqi Kurds are America's only allies in Iraq at present and this makes them uneasy.

The Turkish government and the PKK have had a long history of violence. PKK militants, considered freedom fighters by many Kurds, have killed tens of thousands of Turkish citizens. Particularly in the early 1990s, Turkish security forces have retaliated harshly, arresting numerous intellectuals for expressing Kurdish nationalist sentiments and driving several hundred thousand villagers from their homes in southeastern Turkey.

Islamist Groups. In an effort to ensure that Islam in Turkey remains moderate and compatible with secular democracy, the government micromanages religious expression. Ankara's Religious Affairs Directorate hires and fires all imams, pays their pensions, and outlines the Friday sermon delivered by each of them throughout the country. On the other hand, Islamist expression in Turkey is not restricted to government-controlled preachers and mosques. There are a range of private Islamist organizations in Turkey that do not fall under government control. Some of these groups are peaceful. Others, such as Kaplancilar and Islami Buyuk Akincilar Cephesi (IBDAC), based in Germany, are more militant and operate covertly. Al Qaeda cells have been reported in some areas.

Network 20/20 spoke extensively with representatives of the Gulen movement, which prides themselves on being moderate, tolerant, and ecumenical. Gulen has under its umbrella a powerful conglomerate of media, businesses, schools, universities, and educational publications. In addition to founding 200 schools in Turkey, Gulen has built more than 300 schools and universities in Central Asia and the Balkans. The Gulen community is also present in many Western countries where Turkish immigrants live, including Germany, France, the United States, Canada and Australia. The schools and universities have high standards, stress the importance of science and are open to students of all faiths. High admission fees make them mainly elite institutions.

Gulen schools are popular because of the poor state of education in much of Turkey, Central Asia and the Balkans. Because of their close ties with the middle class, especially merchants and business groups, Gulen networks facilitate extensive trade between Turkey and Central Asia.

Many AKP party members are Gulen school graduates. But Gulen's critics charge that the group's real aim is to create a conservative Islamist government in Turkey. They question why the U.S. provides tacit support for Gulen, whose leader, Fethullah Gulen, left Turkey in 1999 after he faced charges of seeking an Islamist-style regime in Ankara. The Turkish military maintains that the schools, financed through charitable trusts, are

being used to “brainwash” young people. One former general asserted that the Gulen movement was “a radical militant group using sugar-sweet tactics.” He worried that Gulen’s ultimate goal to Islamize society from the bottom-up might grow into a massive movement to overthrow secular governments throughout the region. For those who follow Gulen and for those impressed by their achievements these charges ring hollow.

Some members of Turkish society also fear that in time the moderate AKP will become more conservative, in part to maintain its power base in eastern Anatolia, which is more traditional than the rest of the country. In the fall of 2004 this fear was heightened by the government’s proposal to criminalize adultery, a proposal that it was hastily dropped after an outcry from Europe.

Military. While the current civilian government is strong, the roots of the Turkish Republic are in the military. The strongly secular military see themselves as guardians of the Republic. The military recruits the most outstanding youths and provides them with superior education. The military also plays a role in the economy. For example, the military bank Oyak has declared assets of over \$3.6 billion. Should Turkey’s national security be threatened by external or internal forces, such as radical Islam or a fractured government, the military will be strongly tempted to intervene and change the power structure, even though such intervention would certainly lessen Turkey’s chances of joining the EU.

Economic instability. This is still a concern despite recent reforms and a 10% rise in productivity in 2004. International investors remember the series of economic crises that plagued Turkey in the 1990s and led to an IMF bailout in 2001. Turkish business leaders know that while inflation is finally under control and fiscal policy tight, perils remain. Current-account deficits are large, while foreign investment is small. In 2004 Turkey had less foreign investment than Belarus, which is one third its size and has one sixth of its population. Another persistent problem is the disparity of income between the western and eastern sections of the country. Turks living in Eastern Anatolia engaged in such tasks as shelling pistachio nuts for \$50 a month have incomes comparable to those of Afghan farmers while Turks living in the western part of the country have incomes comparable to their counterparts in Greece. The challenge of bringing electricity, roads and schools to the far reaches of Anatolia is a formidable one, especially when Turkey as a whole needs a better infrastructure for economic development.

Civil Society. Institutionalizing democracy has a long way to go in Turkey and time is needed for civil society, the social capital driving development, to grow and increase in influence. Non-profit groups such as the Turkish Earthquake Foundation and the Search and Rescue Association (AKUT), historically overlooked by Ankara, took on new importance after the August 1999 Earthquake when they came to the assistance of

victims and communities more quickly and effectively than the government in many instances. Youth organizations such as the national ARI Movement and the Young Leaders of Anatolia play a role in Turkey, where more than 60% of the population is under 30. The goal of these groups is to promote volunteerism among Turkish youth, encouraging young people to participate in democracy and become informed civic voices. They serve as a counterbalance to radical Islamic youth groups, whose agendas tend to focus on helping the Palestinians and rejecting the West.

There are more than 200 women's organizations in Turkey. Some are secular and Western-leaning. Others are more conservative, seeking reforms within a more traditional interpretation of Islam. Women have gained legal rights under the new AKP government and are now working on getting these rights translated into practice. They know that this will take time and look to the EU accession process with its emphasis on human rights to help catalyze the process. Purple Roof Women's Shelter Foundation, Ka-Mer, Flying Broom, Association of Support for Women Candidates, and the Turkish Women's Association are a few examples of women's groups that operate without state aid and strive to help Turkish women live independent lives, free of violence.

One dynamic women's group, KADER, founded in 1997, is working to increase the number of women working in all fields. While women are currently well represented in the fields of law and higher education, only 4.4% of Parliament members are women. KADER and other women's groups also press for property rights, education, and the end of honor killings and other forms of domestic violence. Despite shared agendas, western leaning women's groups and conservative women's groups often lose potential for synergy by failing to work together.

Political reforms are essential to the growth of civil society in Turkey. Business groups such as the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (TUSIAD) are actively engaged in reforming election laws and laws governing political parties, and working to establish needed checks and balances in the government.

Religious freedom is particularly circumscribed when it involves the Greek Orthodox Church, which some Turks view as a Trojan horse for Greeks seeking to undermine Turkey. The Greek Orthodox seminary on the island of Halki remains closed despite pressure from the U.S. and the international community. Even though the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, His All Holiness Bartholomew I, is based in Istanbul, there are currently no new Greek Orthodox priests being trained in Turkey.

U.S. – Turkish Relations

Fissures are opening up between the U.S. and Turkey. Turkey has enjoyed a special relationship with the U.S. because of its geopolitical position bordering the greater Middle East, a region of great U.S. national security importance. Bilateral relations flourished in the late 1990s, especially after 1997 when the EU declined to accept Turkey as a candidate for membership. Commercial ties increased as did joint energy projects, including a planned major pipeline bringing oil from the Caspian Sea through Turkey to the U.S. and the West. The number of Turkish students being educated in the U.S. soared. Turkey was invited to participate in the 2004 G8 Summit thanks to America's support. But despite these positive achievements, Turkish-American relations have deteriorated in recent years.

Once Turkey was offered EU candidacy and the AKP was in Ankara, it began to align itself with Europe on issues such as the World Court, the U.S. occupation of Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey agrees with the European Union, for example that reform and progress in the Middle East cannot happen until there is a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This puts Turkey at odds with the Bush Administration's policy of de-linking the two issues.

Currently, Ankara and Washington are focusing more on issues that divide them, such as Iraq, than on those that have united them in the past. Negotiations for EU accession will probably move Turkey even closer to Europe, but we argue that this would be an acceptable outcome for the United States. The U.S. has much to gain economically from a stable, prosperous, secular and democratic Turkey that will have a population of 80 million consumers by 2014.

The Iraq war sparked widespread criticism of U.S. policy among Turks and increased the diplomatic gap between Turkey and the U.S. public opinion against both the U.S. and the war helps explain Turkey's unwillingness to allow U.S. troops to enter Iraq through Eastern Anatolia in March 2003. Negative public opinion, the desire to align itself with Europe, and a conspicuous lapse in effective AKP leadership led to the government's failure to get enough votes to grant the U.S. request. This blunder, considered so even by members of the AKP cost Turkey considerable financial rewards as well as a promised area of neutrality in northern Iraq.

Despite the downsides of this decision for Turkey, anti-Americanism continues to be widespread among Turkish officials and other opinion makers. "Doesn't the U.S. know that it is the problem in Iraq, not the solution?" is an oft-heard refrain.

Communications and Public Diplomacy Broken Down. The U.S. government has made no significant effort to engage Turkish citizens since President Clinton's visit to Turkey after the 1999 earthquake. Turkish military sources express concern that the U.S. State Department made strategic decisions on Iraq and consulted their Turkish government counterparts rather than consulting them, the military, directly. Business leaders, not privy to U.S.-Turkish talks and therefore misinformed, ask why President Bush announced that Turkey would be a partner in America's Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative without consulting with either Turkey or the 40 Arab countries in question. It is not surprising that 72% of Turkish citizens have a negative view of this initiative and two thirds of the population is pro-Palestinian because they believe that the U.S. and Israel are co-conspirators in the oppression of Muslims across the Middle East.

It is clear that even if Washington supports Turkey's EU candidacy and eases tensions over the Iraqi Kurds, there will be little improvement in bilateral relations unless the U.S. government improves its public diplomacy.

Network 20/20 Delegation

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George Billard

Documentary Filmmaker; Student, JFK School of Government, Harvard University. President of Miracle Media, Inc., which produced "The Well-Seasoned Traveler," for network television. President of Do Diligence, Inc., a company which produced, directed and photographed a motion picture library of international imagery from over two dozen countries.

Dr. Tai-Heng Cheng

Attorney at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP, focusing on complex litigation and international arbitration. Previous and forthcoming publications cover international investments, human rights and state succession. Former Senior Officer of the Singapore Police Force, advised on counter-terrorism, criminal, constitutional and legislative matters. Provided legal services to the Prosecutor General of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor. Graduated with law degrees from Oxford University and Yale Law School.

Leo Clark

Director, the Aslan Group, a consulting group pursuing business prospects in finance and international trade, focusing specifically on business connections between the West and Asia. Former Director of Bank International of Afghanistan and former Vice President at J.P. Morgan.

Courtney Doggart

Network 20/20 Turkey Project Coordinator. Proficient in Turkish and Russian. B.A. *magna cum laude* from New York University with History and Russian and Slavic Studies concentration. Traveled extensively through Eastern Europe and Turkey. Invited to return to Turkey to study youth participation in Turkish civil society.

Dr. Patricia S. Huntington

Network 20/20 Founder and President, consultant to grant makers in foreign policy, former clients include American Express, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. Department of State. Author, position paper, "Landmines and U.S. Leadership: A View from the Field." Creator of educational CD-ROM on global humanitarian mine clearance entitled, "Landmines: Clearing the Way," that has been disseminated widely throughout the world. Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Women's Foreign Policy Group, and Women in International Security,

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Jean McGillicuddy

Former Executive Director at Morgan Stanley in the Joint Venture between the Foreign Exchange and Investment Banking Divisions. Provided currency hedging advice and execution for large strategic cross-border investment banking transactions, including a \$10 billion deal associated with a cross border acquisition of a European asset. Graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Smith College with a mathematics thesis on Fractals. Completed one year of reading mathematics at Oxford University. Obtained a Masters of Science in Management at MIT Sloan School of Management.

Brigitte Rajacic

Attorney at Law. She is the Co-Chair of International Law and Practice Committee at New York Women's Bar Association. Traveled to Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Brazil with New York University's Stern School of Business. Fluent in Polish and conversational in Serbo-Croatian.

Lena Sene

Vice-Chair International Trips and Exchanges Committee of Network 20/20. Investment Representative in the Private Investment Management Division of Lehman Brothers. Provides wealth management advisory services for high net worth individuals, families and medium-sized institutions in New York, Washington D.C. and Atlanta. Former Private Banker at JP Morgan Private Bank. Co-founded the Global Private Banking Analyst Forum, an initiative that has resulted in an international exchange of best practices at JP Morgan. Oversaw representatives in Chile, China, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Sole recipient of the 2003 Annual JP Morgan Chase Rising Star Award.

Born in the U.S., raised in Russia, the Ukraine and Senegal. Fluent in English, French, Russian and Wolof. Bates College graduate with a bachelor's degree in Economics.

Julie Grimes Waldorf

Corporate Counsel for Ford Models, Inc. and Former General Counsel of The Vitamin Shoppe and CEO of TravelCharts. Former corporate attorney at the international law firm Pillsbury Winthrop in New York. Deputy Editor-in-Chief for the *Harvard International Law Journal* while attending Harvard Law School. Former clerk for Judge Barksdale on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Experience with trade, security and humanitarian issues involving Turkey through previous work for the U.S. Trade Representative in the Office of Europe and the Mediterranean for USAID in the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and for The Atlantic Council in the NATO Information Office.

Project Director

Richard Murphy

Chairman, Network 20/20 Global Public Security Project. Richard M. Murphy is a senior editor at Fortune Small Business magazine. He holds an undergraduate degree in literature from Harvard College and a doctorate in social anthropology from Oxford University, based on fieldwork in Pakistan, where he was a Fulbright Scholar. Murphy's journalism has appeared in Fortune, The Wall Street Journal, The New Republic, the New York Times, and many other media. He is currently under contract with Alfred A. Knopf to write "Lahore Nights," a memoir about the culture and politics of contemporary Pakistan.

List of persons interviewed in Turkey

Academia

Atila Askar	<i>President Koç University</i>
Fatoş Göksen	<i>Assistant Professor of Sociology Koç University</i>
Fuat Keyman	<i>Professor of International Relations Koç University</i>
Hasan Subaşı	<i>Distinguished Executive in Residence Koç University</i>
Şuhnaz Yılmaz	<i>Department of International Relations Koç University</i>
Barış Tan	<i>Professor of Operations Management Director of Graduate School of Business Koç University</i>
Kemal Yılmaz	<i>MBA Student Koç University</i>
S. Gülden Ayman	<i>Director, TÜSIAD Boğaziçi University, Foreign Policy Forum</i>

Think tanks and Non-profit organizations

Hasan Ali Karasar	<i>Chairman, Turkestan Studies ASAM (Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies)</i>
Major General (Ret.) Armağan Kuloğlu	<i>Head of Geopolitics and Strategic Studies ASAM</i>
Navy Captain (Ret.) Yılmaz Aklar	<i>Senior Researcher, Geopolitics and Strategic Studies ASAM</i>
Kemal Köprülü	<i>General Coordinator ARI Movement</i>
Özgül Erdemli	<i>Secretary General, International Relations ARI Movement</i>
Haluk Önen	<i>Member of the Coordination Council ARI Movement</i>
Kaya Aslan	<i>Deputy General Secretary ARI Movement</i>
Elcan Yılmaz	<i>Board Member ARI Movement</i>

Ural Aküzüm	<i>General Secretary of Local Development ARI Movement</i>
M. Faruk Demir	<i>General Manager GELECEK International Consultancy</i>
Altay Gökakın	<i>Senior Advisor GELECEK International Consultancy</i>
Fatma Kabasakallı	<i>Foreign Relations Assistant GELECEK International Consultancy</i>
Ayşe Bilge Dicleli	<i>Chairwoman KA-DER (Association for Support and Training of Women Candidates)</i>
Sevi Bozoğlu	<i>Attorney at Law KA-DER</i>
Seyhan Ekşioğlu	<i>Attorney at Law KA-DER</i>
Nil Mutluer	<i>Academician İstanbul Bilgi University KA-DER</i>
Ayşe Bilge Dicleli	<i>Publisher KA-DER</i>
Dr. Mustafa Şahin	<i>President European Studies Department, ASAM</i>
Şanlı Bahadır Koç	<i>Researcher USA Research Desk, ASAM</i>
Rana Birden Güneş	<i>Civil Society Development Programme</i>

Business

Erkut Yüceoğlu	<i>TÜSIAD (Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association)</i>
Ahmet Ciğer	<i>Vice President İSHAD (Business Life Cooperation Association)</i>
Levent Kenez	<i>Deputy Secretary General Foreign Relations, İSHAD</i>
Mustafa M. Günay	<i>Executive Board Member / Secretary General İSHAD</i>
İsmail Köksal	<i>Secretary General TOBB (Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)</i>
Füsün Karacasoy	<i>Manager, Department of International Relations TOBB</i>

Duru D. Özkaban	<i>Head, Department of Foreign Economic Relations TOBB</i>
Kemaleddin Koyuncu	<i>Deputy Head of Department Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency</i>
Ahmed K. Han	<i>Executive Consultant Turkish Exporters Assembly</i>
O. Faruk Berksan	<i>President KAR Groups of Companies</i>
Mustafa Baştuğ	<i>Chairman of the Board Uşak Industrialists and Businessmen Association</i>
Ahmet Demirel	<i>Senior Executive Vice President TSKB (Turkish Development Bank)</i>
Süleyman Kan	<i>Chairman of the Board Baykan Group</i>
Yaşar Küçükçalık	<i>President Küçükçalık</i>
Ömer Sengüller	<i>Chairman Sessfoods</i>
Dr. Erkut Yücedoğlu	<i>Chairman of the Board TURKUAZ Tourism Investment and Trade</i>
Ahmet Çalık	<i>President Çalık Holding</i>
Necdet Timur	<i>Orgeneral, (Ret.)</i>
Erdal Bahçivan	<i>General Manager Bahçivan Food Industry and Trade A.S.</i>
M. Fatih Balatacı	<i>General Manager AKFEL Group, Energy and Pipeline Solutions</i>
Gülşün Bozkurt	<i>Sultan Kaniklari (The Sultan's Boat)</i>
Selçuk Sevinç	<i>Assistant to the President Calik Holding, A.S.</i>

Serhat Albayrak	<i>Deputy General Manager Calik Holding, A.S.</i>
Evrin Rizvanoğlu	<i>Business Development Manager Fermak Construction Company</i>

Government

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan	<i>Prime Minister</i>
Egemen Bağış	<i>Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister</i>

Ali Babacan	<i>State Minister in Charge of Economy (AKP)</i>
Mustafa Rumeli	<i>Chief of Staff, Office of the State Minister Ali Babacan</i>
Cemil Çiçek	<i>Minister of Justice (AKP)</i>
Mehmet Kemal Bozay	<i>Director of Iraq Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>
Ebru Barutçu	<i>Head of Department, Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>
Dr. Sükrü M. Elekdağ	<i>Member of Parliament İstanbul, Turkish General Assembly</i>
T. Ziyaddin Akbulut	<i>Member of the Parliament Tekirdağ, Turkish General Assembly</i>
Meral Barlas	<i>Deputy Directorate General for the Americas Ministry of Foreign Affairs</i>

Local Government

Mustafa Sarıgül	<i>Mayor of Şişli, İstanbul</i>
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American Embassy in Ankara

Eric Edelman	<i>U.S. Ambassador to Turkey</i>
John Kunstadter	<i>Advisor, Political Affairs</i>
Stuart Smith	<i>Political and Economic Section Chief Consulate General of the United States of America</i>

Media

Aslı Aydintaşbaş	<i>Columnist Yeni Binyıl</i>
Nuri Çolakoğlu	<i>Coordinator for Print Media and TVs DOĞAN Media Group</i>
Ekrem Dumanlı	<i>Editor- in- Chief Turkish Daily ZAMAN</i>
Abdülhamit Bilici	<i>Foreign News Editor Turkish Daily ZAMAN</i>
Doğan Satmış	<i>Hürriyet</i>
Harun Tokak	<i>President The Journalists and Writers Foundation</i>
Mustafa Akyol	<i>Director of International Relations Journalists and Writers Foundation</i>
Nevval Sevindi	<i>Journalist/ Writer and Chief Advisor</i>

	<i>Journalists and Writers Foundation</i>
Murat Yetkin	<i>Ankara Representative Turkish Daily RADIKAL</i>
Sedat Ergin	<i>Hürriyet</i>
Celil Sağır	<i>Diplomatic Correspondent ZAMAN</i>
İsmail Birol Konuk	<i>Journalists and Writers Foundation</i>

Military

İlhan Kılıç	<i>General TUAF (Ret.) 22nd Commander TUAF</i>
Dr. H. Edip Başer	<i>Director Yeditepe University Institute of Atatürk's Principles and Revolution History</i>
Ogan Soysal	<i>Strategic and Social Researchers Foundation The Marmara Group</i>

List of Persons Interviewed in the United States

Washington

Abdullah Akyuz	<i>Representative to the United States Turkish Industrialist' and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD)</i>
Zeyno Baran	<i>Director, International Security and Energy Programs Nixon Center</i>
Yakup Beris	<i>Deputy Representative TUSIAD</i>
Matt Bryza	<i>Director of Aegean, Caucasus and Central Asia U.S. National Security Council</i>
Soner Cagaptay	<i>Director of the Turkish Research Program Washington Institute for Near East Policy</i>
O. Faruk Logoglu	<i>Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey Embassy of the Republic of Turkey</i>
Larry Silverman	<i>Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs U.S. Department of State</i>

New York

Turkkaya Atavo	<i>Professor Ankara University</i>
Talat Halman	<i>Professor</i>

Clark B. Lombardi *Ankara University*
Dilek Pamir *Cleary Gottlieb Steen and Hamilton*
Wife of the Permanent Representative of Turkey
to the United Nations
Ömer Önhon *Consul General*
Consulate of the Republic of Turkey in New York
Rodney B. Wagner *Retired Vice-Chairman*
J.P. Morgan

Boston

Samuel Huntington *Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor*
Department of Government, Harvard University

Pittsburg

Omer Bilen *Master Candidate in Public Policy and Management*
Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University
Martin Black *Director, Career Services*
Carnegie Mellon University
Suleyman Erdem *Master Candidate in Public Policy and Management*
Heinz School, Carnegie Mellon University